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COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH AS
CHOICE ARCHITECTURE: THE BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS SOLUTION TO THE
HEALTH CARE COST CRISIS
Russell Korobkin*
With the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) set to dramati-
cally increase access to medical care, the problem of rising costs will move
center stage in health law and policy discussions. “Consumer directed health
care” proposals, which provide patients with financial incentives to equate
marginal costs and benefits of care at the point of treatment, demand more
decisionmaking ability from consumers than is plausible due to bounded ra-
tionality. Proposals that seek to change the incentives of health care providers
threaten to create conflicts of interest between doctors and patients. New ap-
proaches are desperately needed.
This Article proposes a government-facilitated but market-based approach to
improving efficiency in the private market for medical care that I call “relative
value health insurance.” This approach focuses on the “choice architecture”
necessary to enable even boundedly rational patients to contract for an effi-
cient level of health care services through their health insurance purchase deci-
sions. It uses comparative effectiveness research, which the ACA funds at a
significant level for the first time, to rate medical treatments on a scale of one
to ten based on their relative value, taking into account expected costs and
benefits. These relative value ratings would enable consumers to contract with
insurers for different levels of medical care at different prices, reflecting differ-
ent cost–quality trade-offs.
The Article describes both the benefits of relative value health insurance and
the impediments to its implementation. It concludes with a brief discussion of
how relative value ratings could also help to rationalize expenditures on public
health insurance programs.
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Introduction
Since the 1960s, health care spending in the United States has consist-
ently increased—often by significant amounts—as a percentage of gross do-
mestic product (“GDP”).1 Accounting for 5.2% of GDP in 1960, health care
1. See Council of Econ. Advisors, The Affordable Care Act and Trends in Health Care
Spending, White House, 2 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/fact_
sheet_implementing_the_affordable_care_act_from_the_erp_2013_final1.pdf.
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expenditures grew to 7.2% of GDP in 1970, 9.2% in 1980, 12.5% in 1990,
13.8% in 2000, and 17.9% in 2011.2 In 2013, the Congressional Budget Of-
fice predicted that without sharp, systemic change, 22% of domestic eco-
nomic production will be devoted to health care by 2038.3
As total health care spending has increased, so too has the cost of private
health insurance. As of 2013, the average cost of insurance coverage for a
single adult with an employer-sponsored plan was $5,884, and a standard
employer-sponsored policy for a family of four ran $16,351.4 For American
families, increasing private insurance costs have meant that workers who
continue to enjoy employer-based health insurance have seen wages stagnate
and out-of-pocket health care costs increase rapidly as employers have
scrambled to maintain benefits. An estimated 46% of real wage increases
went to employees’ share of health insurance premiums each year from 2000
to 2009.5 For the average worker with single coverage, annual contributions
to premiums increased by 97% between 2003 and 2013;6 out-of-pocket de-
ductibles increased from 17% to 138%, depending on the type of plan, from
just 2006 to 2013;7 and the number of people with a deductible of at least
$2,000 increased five-fold during the same time period.8 Public expenditures
on medical care have also increased sharply. In fiscal year 2012, Medicare,
Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”) cost the
federal government an estimated $732 billion, 21% of its total budget.9 That
2. National Health Expenditure Tables, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
tbl.1, http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf (last visited Sept.
15, 2013).
3. The 2013 Long-Term Budget Outlook, Cong. Budget Office, 43–44 (Sept. 2013),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44521-LTBO2013.pdf; cf. Sally T.
Burner et al., National Health Expenditures Projections Through 2030, Health Care Financ-
ing Rev., Fall 1992, at 1, 2 (estimating that health care spending will rise to 32 percent of GDP
in 2030); Council of Econ. Advisers, Exec. Office of the President, The Economic Case for
Health Care Reform, White House, 2 (June 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/
documents/CEA_Health_Care_Report.pdf (estimating that health care spending will rise to 28
percent of GDP in 2030).
4. The Kaiser Family Found. & Health Research & Educ. Trust, Employer
Health Benefits: 2013 Annual Survey, 3, 12 (Aug. 20, 2013) [hereinafter KFF 2013 An-
nual Survey], available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/8465-
employer-health-benefits-20131.pdf.
5. See Christina Romer & Mark Duggan, Exploring the Link Between Rising Health In-
surance Premiums and Stagnant Wages, Council of Economic Advisers (Mar. 12, 2010,
12:17 PM), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/12/exploring-link-between-
rising-health-insurance-premiums-and-stagnant-wages (indicating that while wages increased
by 1.3%, employees saw an increase of only 0.7% because the other 0.6%, representing 46% of
the total 1.3% increase, went to employee contributions to health insurance premiums).
6. See KFF 2013 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 69.
7. See id. at 108.
8. Id. at 111.
9. Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, Center on Budget & Pol’y
Priorities, 1 (last updated Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-14-08tax.pdf.
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number is up from less than 10% in 1985.10 Medicaid spending alone now
comprises 15% of all state government spending,11 up from 10% in 1987.12
The United States is a wealthy country, so it is not obvious that it should
not spend such a large share of its national resources on medical care. But
rapidly increasing costs, coupled with the well-known fact that the health
and longevity of Americans lag behind those of citizens of other developed
nations that spend less of their wealth on medical care,13 at least suggests
that the nation probably allocates an inefficiently large fraction of national
resources to health care, compared to competing goods and services. At a
bare minimum, the continuing rapid escalation of health care costs will—if
unchecked—result in the nation allocating a larger percentage of national
wealth to medical care than is efficient at some point in the not-too-distant
future.
The primary market-based approach to reining in health care costs is
generally referred to in policy discussions as “consumer directed health care”
(“CDHC”). The simple idea underlying CDHC is that patients will demand
less care if they are burdened with a greater responsibility for paying the
actual cost of that care than is common in our current system, in which
costs are largely borne by public or private health insurance with little pa-
tient cost sharing.14 CDHC implicitly relies on the “rational choice” assump-
tion of neoclassical economics that, given the proper incentive structure,
individual consumers will allocate resources between medical care and other
10. Calculated using data from Christopher Chantrill, Government Spending Details,
U.S. Gov’t Spending, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/year1985_0.html (last visited
Sept. 15, 2013), and Ben Wilcox, Medicare and Medicaid, Harv. Pol. Rev. (Sept. 17, 2010, 4:38
PM), http://hpronline.org/arusa/medicare-and-medicaid/.
11. Policy Basics: Where Do Our State Tax Dollars Go?, Center on Budget & Pol’y
Priorities, 1 (last updated Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-statetax
dollars.pdf.
12. Medicaid 101: A Primer for State Legislators, Council of St. Gov’ts, 2 (Jan. 2009),
http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/Medicaid_Primer_final_screen.pdf.
13. As of 2013, the United States ranked fifty-first in the world in terms of life expec-
tancy. Country Comparison: Life Expectancy at Birth, Centr. Intelligence Agency, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html (last visited
Sept. 15, 2013). In 2011, the United States ranked fourth in terms of per capita health care
expenditures. See Health Financing: Health Expenditure Per Capita by Country, World Health
Org., http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.78?lang=en (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). Com-
pared to twelve other industrial nations, relative health care spending per capita increased in
the United States between 1975 and 2010 while relative life expectancy for middle-aged citizens
decreased. Peter A. Muennig & Sherry A. Glied, What Changes in Survival Rates Tell Us About
US Health Care, 29 Health Aff. 2105, 2111 (2010).
14. Under typical twenty-first century “managed care” insurance plans, coinsurance
rates (in the form of deductibles and copayments) are very low. See, e.g., KFF 2013 Annual
Survey, supra note 4, at 126 (showing rates of 3% for health maintenance organization plans,
15% for preferred provider organization plans, and 4% for point-of-service plans for in-net-
work primary care physician office visits). Patient cost sharing has, in fact, been decreasing as a
percentage of total U.S. health care expenditures for fifty years. See National Health Expendi-
ture Tables, supra note 2, tbl.3. In 2002, less than 14% of U.S. health care spending came
directly from patients. Michael F. Cannon & Michael D. Tanner, Healthy Competition:
What’s Holding Back Health Care and How to Free It 53 fig. 4.1 (2d ed. 2007).
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goods and services (and, within the category of medical care, between com-
peting treatment options) in a manner that maximizes their “subjective ex-
pected utility” (“SEU”).15 As I explain below, there are compelling reasons to
believe, however, that most consumers, as boundedly rational deci-
sionmakers, would be particularly bad at making efficient trade-offs when
asked to make point-of-service medical care decisions.
One view within the field of behavioral law and economics is that
policymakers should use hard law and softer institutional structures to
“nudge” imperfect decisionmakers in the presumably efficient direction,
while allowing them the liberty to make other choices should they strongly
desire.16 But a less paternalistic approach, and one that is more practical
when public officials are uncertain ex ante which choices would maximize
the SEU of most decisionmakers,17 is for public officials to facilitate private
choices in ways that will increase the likelihood that the individuals will be
able to make personally utility-maximizing choices. This Article describes a
novel, “choice architecture” approach that can help individuals to more op-
timally allocate their resources between medical care and other goods and
services. Under this approach, the government would produce and dispense
information concerning the costs and benefits of medical treatments suffi-
cient to enable consumers and health insurers to contract for what I call
“relative value health insurance” (“RVHI”), a product that covers medical
interventions that meet or exceed a given level of cost-effectiveness.
Having survived Supreme Court review,18 the landmark 2010 health
care reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA” or “the Act”) is now set to significantly expand access to medical
care.19 While most commentators agree that the Act is unlikely to have more
than a modest effect on stemming the rapidly increasing cost of medical
15. See Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?,
2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1653, 1655 (2011) (discussing the concept of subjective expected utility).
16. See generally Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Deci-
sions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (rev. ed. 2009). Thaler and Sunstein have
called this approach “libertarian paternalism.” Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Liberta-
rian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159 (2003).
17. See generally Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1651,
1666–70 (2009) (raising the “indeterminacy” objection to the concept of libertarian
paternalism).
18. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (plurality opinion in
part).
19. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling that made the Act’s expansion of Medicaid
eligibility optional for states, id. at 2607–08 (plurality opinion), the Congressional Budget
Office (“CBO”) estimated that an additional twenty-five million Americans will obtain public
or private health insurance coverage by 2023. Jessica Banthin & Sarah Masi, CBO’s Estimate of
the Net Budgetary Impact of the Affordable Care Act’s Health Insurance Coverage Provisions Has
Not Changed Much over Time, Cong. Budget Off. (May 14, 2013), http://www.cbo.gov/
publication/44176.
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care,20 a relatively overlooked provision can serve as the starting point for
the promotion of RVHI. The Act provides significant funding for govern-
ment-sponsored “comparative effectiveness research” (“CER”),21 designed to
evaluate the relative efficacy of different treatment options for a particular
condition or ailment.
To facilitate the market for RVHI, government-sponsored CER should
be used to evaluate different treatments for various medical conditions and
rate them on a scale of “1” (high) to “10” (low) in terms of cost-effective-
ness. Health insurance agencies could then use these transparent ratings as
the basis for different coverage offerings. For example, an insurance com-
pany might offer three plans: (1) a policy that covers only treatments with a
rating of “3” or higher at annual premium price $X, (2) a policy that covers
only treatments rated “5” or higher at annual premium price $Y, and (3) a
policy that covers only treatments rated “7” or higher at annual premium
price $Z.
Consumers of health care would then decide at the time they purchase
insurance—not at the time of illness—whether they wish to purchase rela-
tively “shallow” insurance that covers only the most cost-effective interven-
tions at a correspondingly modest price, or relatively “deep” insurance that
covers increasingly less cost-effective treatments but at a higher price. The
simple numerical rating scale would provide boundedly rational consumers
with a useful tool for allocating resources between their medical care and
other goods and services. If consumers wish to forgo expensive medical
treatments that provide limited benefits, health care cost inflation will de-
crease. If consumers choose to buy high-priced insurance that covers mar-
ginally beneficial services, health care cost inflation will continue until
marginal costs exceed marginal benefits, but these increases will represent an
efficient allocation of national wealth.
Part I of this Article describes how the combination of rapid technologi-
cal innovation and the fundamental problem of moral hazard in the market
for health insurance has driven our country to—or at least toward—the
inefficient overallocation of resources to medical care. Part II explains how
CDHC proposals target this moral hazard problem but cannot sufficiently
rationalize medical care expenditures because boundedly rational consumers
cannot make the complex cost–benefit trade-offs at the point of treatment
that the theory demands. Part III argues that the problem cannot be solved
by proposals that would compensate physicians for more efficient resource
utilization.
20. See, e.g., Michael K. Gusmano, Do We Really Want to Control Health Care Spending?,
36 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 495, 495 (2011) (noting that “few analysts accept” the adminis-
tration’s claim “that health care reform will reduce spending”); Richard S. Saver, Health Care
Reform’s Wild Card: The Uncertain Effectiveness of Comparative Effectiveness Research, 159 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 2147, 2149 (2011) (“Many health policy experts believe that the [ACA] . . . does
not sufficiently address intractable cost and quality problems . . . .”).
21. See Harold C. Sox, Comparative Effectiveness Research: A Progress Report, 152 An-
nals Internal Med. 469, 470–71 (2010), available at http://annals.org/article.aspx?articleid=
746204#xref-ref-10-1.
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Part IV introduces the concept of RVHI, in which private insurance
markets coalesce around publicly provided relative value ratings of medical
interventions. It considers the legal and informational barriers to RVHI and
shows how CER, viewed expansively, can help to overcome them. Part V
describes how RVHI would create the choice architecture that would facili-
tate efficient market behavior as well as provide the important secondary
benefits of controlling costs without creating conflicts of interest between
patients and physicians and encouraging more efficient investment in medi-
cal innovations. Part VI considers the theoretical drawbacks and practical
obstacles associated with RVHI, including the current lack of useful data, the
value choices implicit in any rating system, the risk of industry capture of
the rating process, the possibility of adverse selection, and potential conflicts
with the ACA.
Part VII concludes the Article by discussing how building a public sys-
tem of relative value ratings could facilitate more rational political discus-
sion about cost control for the major public health insurance programs,
Medicare and Medicaid, in addition to helping to rationalize private health
care spending.
I. The Problem of Moral Hazard
The economically efficient amount of medical care is provided when its
marginal cost equals its marginal benefit. When an individual patient de-
cides whether to obtain treatment, however, he will usually compare its ex-
pected benefits only to the marginal cost of that care to him. When marginal
costs are borne by a third party, the individual patient has a private incentive
to overconsume care, a problem known as “moral hazard.”22
When a patient has health insurance, the financial costs of care to him
are usually low and in some cases zero. The financial costs of the care still
exist, of course, but the insurer bears them and then passes them on to all
policy holders (or, in the case of public insurance, to the taxpayers). The
result is that most patients will choose to consume nearly all medical care
that has a private expected benefit that exceeds the nonfinancial costs of the
care, such as inconvenience, time away from work, and physical discomfort.
To be sure, these nonfinancial costs often are not trivial, so the moral hazard
problem associated with health insurance is less severe than would result
from, say, ice cream insurance. But there is no doubt that the widespread
use of public or private insurance to fund medical care leads to greater con-
sumption of medical care than the efficient amount.23
As medical technology improves, the scope of the moral hazard problem
increases. Because private or public insurance finances most medical care,
producers of new drugs, medical products, diagnostic devices, and the like
22. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient Cost-Sharing and Healthcare
Spending Growth, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 2011, at 47, 52–53.
23. See, e.g., Cannon & Tanner, supra note 14, at 37 (“When individuals perceive
health care to be free, the quantity demanded increases.”).
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know that there will be a market for new treatments that promise to reduce
mortality or morbidity, almost without regard to the cost of such innova-
tions. As more medical interventions with such positive expected benefits
are developed, inefficient marginal overconsumption of medical care occurs
at an increasing rate.24 This is the case even if the total value of a new medi-
cal technology exceeds its total cost,25 and even if patients sometimes also
inefficiently underconsume care because they misestimate its value or because
they can externalize high costs that arise tomorrow when they fail to take
cheaper preventative measures today.26
This is not to say that moral hazard is the only cause of the high cost of
medical care in the United States. There is extensive evidence that Americans
pay higher prices for the same services than do consumers in other devel-
oped countries,27 meaning that laws shifting more bargaining power from
providers to payers could probably reduce costs,28 although perhaps to the
detriment of quality in the long term.29 Improved efficiency in the delivery
of medical care might also help to reduce the cost of care,30 and some provi-
sions enacted as part of the ACA might facilitate incremental improvements
24. See, e.g., Peter R. Orszag & Philip Ellis, The Challenge of Rising Health Care Costs—A
View from the Congressional Budget Office, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 1793, 1794 (2007) (“The
bulk of [health care] spending growth . . . [results] from the development and diffusion of new
medical technologies and therapies. . . . [E]vidence strongly suggests that many treatments and
services are provided to patients who could do just as well with less expensive care.”).
25. See David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth
It?, Health Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2001, at 11, 18, 21 (claiming that advances in certain technologies
return 6 to 7 dollars of benefits for every dollar of cost).
26. See generally Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 543,
556–57 (2011) (discussing the problem of underuse); Amitabh Chandra et al., Patient Cost-
Sharing and Hospitalization Offsets in the Elderly, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 193, 194 (2010) (finding
that increases in copayments for prescription drugs can reduce drug utilization spending but
simultaneously increase hospitalization costs).
27. In 2012, the average charge for a day of hospitalization was $4,287 in the United
States versus $1,472 in Australia and $853 in France; the average cost of a hip replacement was
$40,364 in the United States versus $11,889 in the United Kingdom and $9,574 in Switzerland.
2012 Comparative Price Report: Variation in Medical and Hospital Prices by Country, Int’l
Fed’n Health Plans, 9, 15, http://ww.ifhp.com/documents/2012iFHPPriceReportFINAL
April3.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
28. For example, the law could make hospital consolidation more difficult, which has
been associated with above-average price increases. Cory Capps & David Dranove, Hospital
Consolidation and Negotiated PPO Prices, Health Aff., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 175; see also
Eduardo Porter, Health Care’s Overlooked Cost Factor, N.Y. Times, June 11, 2013, at B1, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/business/examinations-of-health-costs-overlook-
mergers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting evidence that the purpose of some hospital
mergers is to increase bargaining leverage over health insurers).
29. See, e.g., Karen E. Joynt & Ashish K. Jha, The Relationship Between Cost and Quality:
No Free Lunch, 307 JAMA 1082 (2012).
30. See, e.g., Michael Macdonnell & Ara Darzi, A Key to Slower Health Spending Growth
Worldwide Will Be Unlocking Innovation to Reduce the Labor-Intensity of Care, 32 Health Aff.
653, 655–57 (2013).
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in this regard.31 Finally, there are certainly medical treatments that could be
eliminated solely by providing patients or medical care providers with better
information, because the treatments have nonfinancial costs but do not
make patients any healthier on average, or even make them less healthy on
average.32 But fundamental and ongoing cost containment requires institu-
tional reforms that discourage the health care delivery system from provid-
ing treatments with a positive expected benefit when the costs of producing
positive results exceed the value of the benefits.
II. Consumer Directed Health Care
A. CDHC as an Approach
In current academic and policy debates, CDHC is the conceptual ap-
proach to reducing the costs of medical care that most directly seeks to ad-
dresses the problem of moral hazard. Proponents of CDHC propose
increasing the marginal financial cost of medical care imposed directly on
patients, thus providing patients with a greater incentive to equate marginal
cost with marginal benefit.33 To satisfy this goal, CDHC proponents support
policies that subsidize or otherwise encourage health insurance with high
annual deductibles or high copayments at the point of service.34
The Health Savings Account (“HSA”) program, instituted as part of the
2003 Medicare Modernization Act,35 is a favorite of CDHC advocates.36 This
program permits individuals who purchase qualified health insurance poli-
cies with high deductibles to establish tax-advantaged savings accounts.
31. The ACA’s incentives for providers to utilize electronic medical records, see Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3002(b)–(d), 124 Stat. 119, 364–65
(2010) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2006)), for example, have the potential to reduce
health care spending, as electronic records have been shown to cut hospital costs. Jonathan A.
Zlabek et al., Early Cost and Safety Benefits of an Inpatient Electronic Health Record, 18 J. Am.
Med. Informatics Ass’n 169 (2011).
32. See, e.g., Elliott Fisher, More Care Is Not Better Care, Nat’l Inst. for Health Care
Mgmt. (Jan. 2005), http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/ExpertV7.pdf.
33. See, e.g., Amelia M. Haviland et al., Growth of Consumer-Directed Health Plans to
One-Half of All Employer-Sponsored Insurance Could Save $57 Billion Annually, 31 Health
Aff. 1009, 1009, 1012–13 (2012).
34. See, e.g., Allison Woo et al., Consumer-Directed Health Arrangements,
KaiserEDU.org, http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-Modules/Consumer-Directed-Health-
Arrangements/Background-Brief.aspx?referrer=search (last updated June 2006) (“[The term]
‘consumer-directed health care’ . . . . applies to a broad range of health plan designs . . . . but is
most commonly used to describe the combination of a high-deductible health insurance plan
with a tax-preferred savings account used to pay for routine health care expenses.”).
35. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 § 1201,
26 U.S.C. §§ 223–24 (2006).
36. See, e.g., Cannon & Tanner, supra note 14, at 69 (calling for “enhancing and ex-
panding” HSAs).
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These accounts, which have achieved considerable popularity among em-
ployer-based health insurance plans,37 can be used for out-of-pocket medical
expenses. Any funds not spent on medical care carry over from year to year
and can eventually become part of the account holder’s estate.
B. Bounded Rationality
The fundamental problem with the CDHC approach is that it assumes a
heroically implausible level of decisionmaking ability on the part of patients
faced with treatment choices at the time of illness. The theoretical power of
CDHC to rationalize medical care decisions requires consumers to make two
kinds of judgments with a high degree of skill: First, they must be able to
interpret complex, probabilistic information concerning the consequences of
various treatment alternatives (including forgoing treatment) in an unbiased
manner. Second, given the differences in attributes of different treatment
alternatives, they must be able to select the alternative with the combination
of attributes, including price, that will provide the most overall utility. Only
when these requirements are satisfied, such that we can say that consumers
have made “accurate” decisions—those that maximize their expected utility
subject to constraints—can we be confident that the efficient amount of
social resources will be allocated to medical care.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of rational-choice-based economic
models of behavior that assume such capabilities, social scientists now
broadly recognize that most decisionmakers, and especially consumers, are
boundedly rational: our limited working memory and cognitive capacity
causes us to simplify complicated decisionmaking problems and seek mental
shortcuts to solving them, economizing on decisionmaking costs but com-
promising accuracy of outcomes.38 Put another way, faced with a difficult
question, people often answer an easier one instead, often without even rec-
ognizing the substitution that is taking place. As Nobel Laureate Daniel
Kahneman describes this process, our mind operates a “System 1” function,
which automatically assesses and responds to data but is poor at logic and
statistical reasoning, and a “System 2” function, which deliberately and labo-
riously makes more reasoned judgments but requires substantially more ef-
fort.39 Because the mind prefers to conserve effort, it tends to favor System 1.
Unconscious reliance on System 1 makes it possible for us to navigate the
complexities of daily life reasonably well without being struck by paralysis,
but the shortcuts on which it relies will sometimes lead to suboptimal
decisions.
Reliance on the mind’s System 1 function means that consumers fail to
make accurate decisions in many contexts. But what we know about the
37. One estimate finds that these plans made up more than 13 percent of employer-
sponsored policies as of 2011. Baicker & Goldman, supra note 22, at 48.
38. See, e.g., James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. Con-
sumer Res. 187, 187 (1998).
39. See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 12, 28 (2011).
February 2014] Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture 533
decisionmaking process suggests that making medical care decisions at the
point of service is particularly problematic. Drawing on established findings
from research on decisionmaking, this Section describes several reasons to
believe that health care consumers’ choices are likely to fall well short of the
rational ideal.
1. Complexity
The difficulty of making value-maximizing decisions increases when the
relevant factual information is highly complex and alternatives have multiple
attributes. To have any hope of selecting the “accurate” treatment option, a
patient would need to learn and understand the cost, inconvenience, mortal-
ity, and morbidity implications of each choice (along a variety of metrics).
This information is almost never reasonably available to patients,40 but even
if we assume that it could be made available,41 accurate choices by consum-
ers would still remain highly unlikely.
Processing large amounts of complex information is mentally costly,
even for individuals with the mental capability and educational background
necessary to do so. As the cost of processing information increases, people
tend to simplify the decision42—in effect, solving an easier problem than the
one that they must actually solve to be sure that their expressed preference
actually maximizes the expected satisfaction of their underlying values.
One way to simplify complex problems without obvious, easy answers is
to selectively consider only a limited amount of information or to adopt
noncompensatory decisionmaking strategies when evaluating that informa-
tion—strategies that do not require the comparison of attributes that are
difficult to compare.43 A “lexicographic” decisionmaking strategy, for exam-
ple, requires the decisionmaker to select the choice alternative that rates
highest on the single most important attribute, ignoring all other attributes.
A prostate cancer patient choosing between surgery and “watchful waiting,”
for example, might favor surgery if his primary concern is life expectancy
but might prefer watchful waiting if his primary concern is either quality of
40. For a thorough, and thoroughly depressing, account of just how unavailable rele-
vant information about both costs and clinical benefits is to patients in the current medical
care environment, see Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers
Direct Health Care?, 35 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 19–31 (2009), and Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency
in Health Care Be Left to the Market?, 26 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 967, 986–87 (2001) (“The
prices of health services are jealously guarded proprietary information.”).
41. Some progress seems to be occurring, albeit slowly. See Tina Rosenberg, Revealing a
Health Care Secret: The Price, N.Y. Times Opinionator (July 31, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/a-new-health-care-approach-dont-hide-the-price/
?hp&_r=0.
42. Kahneman, supra note 39, at 97–108; John W. Payne et al., Measuring Constructed
Preferences: Towards a Building Code, 19 J. Risk & Uncertainty 243, 247 (1999) (“[T]he use
of simple (heuristic) decision processes increases with task complexity.”).
43. Cf. Payne et al., supra note 42, at 251 (“[P]eople often focus on a single option, a
single objective or attribute, or a single assumed state of the world when reasoning about a
decision problem.”).
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life or cost.44 The System 1 mental process can implement this lexicographic
approach, as System 1 is adept at comparing data points on a single metric
(i.e., System 1 allows someone to look at two people and immediately know
which one is taller) but is unable to compare across attributes or consider
multiple issues at one time.45
If there are several important attributes at stake and a range of possible
outcomes on these attributes for each of the alternatives, this type of simpli-
fication can often lead to an inaccurate decision (i.e., one that fails to maxi-
mize the expected overall welfare of the decisionmaker). For example, if the
prostate cancer patient selects surgery because it is associated with greater
average life expectancy (the most important attribute to him), but the ad-
vantage in mortality reduction is small and the differences in expected qual-
ity of life and cost—also important attributes—strongly favor watchful
waiting, it is quite likely that the patient’s choice to undergo surgery fails to
maximize his expected welfare. In this particular example, the result is an
inefficient overspending on medical care, but it is also possible that such
strategies will result in inefficient underspending on medical care in some
cases.
2. Novelty
While traditional economic theory assumes that people have stable and
coherent preference orderings,46 modern decision scientists believe that
many choices and behaviors reflect preferences that are “constructed” in re-
sponse to the contextual features of the decisionmaking problem rather than
revealing the decisionmaker’s static values.47 This is not to say that expressed
preferences are randomly determined or even that no preferences are well
considered and stable. But expressed preferences should be understood as a
function of both the decisionmaker’s innate, subjective desires and of the
decisionmaking context in which the preference is solicited.48 The greater the
effect of context—that is, the extent to which the preference is constructed
(rather than merely uncovered) at the time it is solicited—the less likely that
the decision made will achieve the normative goal of accuracy.
The more times an individual has considered a particular decision, the
more likely he will be to fully understand and fully account for all relevant
44. Bettman et al., supra note 38, at 190.
45. See Kahneman, supra note 39, at 36.
46. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 11, 11 (1988).
47. See generally Robin Gregory et al., Valuing Environmental Resources: A Constructive
Approach, 7 J. Risk & Uncertainty 177 (1993); Payne et al., supra note 42.
48. See Payne et al., supra note 42, at 246 (“Expressed preferences (measured values for
decision objects), in our view, generally reflect both a decision maker’s basic values for high-
lighted attributes (e.g., more money is preferred to less) and the particular (contingent)
heuristics or processing strategies used to combine information selectively in order to con-
struct the required response to a particular situation.”).
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attributes of the available alternatives, including how he will feel, subjec-
tively, in the different states of the world that he will choose now but experi-
ence later. This is why most people have distinct and stable preferences
between chocolate and vanilla ice cream. We have tasted both many times;
we can identify their different attributes (taste, smell, etc.); we can recall, if
imperfectly, how we have felt in the past after finishing bowls of each; and
we can recall making this very choice before and what emotions we exper-
ienced in the aftermath of making the choice. A chocolate ice cream lover
might feel less confident if asked to choose not simply between chocolate
and vanilla but between a chocolate ice cream that costs $5 and a vanilla ice
cream that costs $2 if he has not had much occasion to place a precise value
on the difference between the appeal of the two types. But even when chal-
lenged with this unusual comparison, he can at least draw on a wealth of
relevant experience with the competing goods.
The mutability of expressed preferences is likely to increase with the
novelty of the decisionmaking problem because the decisionmaker has less
prior experience on which to draw.49 And individuals facing marginal medi-
cal care decisions of significance often find themselves in a tremendously
novel position.50 An individual forced to decide whether to spend $200 to
see his primary care physician when he has a potential upper respiratory
infection might be able to draw on past experience making the same choice
in similar circumstances and the resulting affective outcomes, but a breast
cancer patient forced to choose between a variety of different surgical and
medical treatment options, each with a very different price tag, is unlikely to
have had any decision-relevant affective experience on which to rely. In this
situation, the patient will have a difficult time determining how she will
subjectively experience the different attribute-bundles associated with the
different treatment choices.
3. Inconsistent Comparative Information
Attributes of decisionmaking alternatives vary in how difficult they are
to value. The value of some attributes is clear to most decisionmakers with-
out contextual clues; the value of other attributes is less obvious without
points of comparison. Consequently, decisionmakers, who instinctively wish
to economize on decisionmaking costs, tend to give attributes more weight
in decisionmaking problems if they are easy to compare than if they are not,
regardless of whether comparability is correlated with how informative the
attribute is.
For example, when asked to choose between a dictionary with a mint-
condition cover and 10,000 entries or a dictionary with a torn cover and
20,000 entries, most subjects prefer the latter: 20,000 entries is a lot more
49. Cf. Payne et al., supra note 42, at 245 (“[T]he assumption of well-articulated prefer-
ences is tenable only when people are familiar and experienced with the preference
object . . . .”).
50. Cf. Schneider & Hall, supra note 40, at 46 (“[C]hoosing health plans, providers, and
medical treatments swamps you in the unfamiliar.”).
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than 10,000, and the tear in the cover does not significantly affect the dic-
tionary’s functionality.51 But when asked to independently value one of the
two dictionaries standing alone, subjects on average place a higher value on
the 10,000-entry book.52 The condition of the cover is more “evaluable” than
the number of entries. Clearly, a mint-condition cover is desirable, and a
torn cover is undesirable. It is much harder to determine the absolute value
of a stated number of entries, so people tend to pay attention to the cover
when valuing one of the two options. The value of the number of entries is
easier to judge when two dictionaries can be compared on the same attri-
bute, however, so that attribute is given more weight in the decisionmaking
process when there is a clear point of comparison.
The “evaluability” problem is likely to be highly relevant in many medi-
cal care determinations. For example, nearly all medical procedures present
some risks, and it is often difficult for individuals to judge their significance.
A CT scan of the head exposes a patient to approximately 150 millirems of
radiation.53 Because few people would have any idea if this amount is low or
high, it is likely that most patients would ignore the attribute of “radiation
exposure” when deciding whether to undergo a CT scan or forgo the test.
An MRI scan provides no radiation exposure, however, which is obviously
less than 150 millirems and thus clearly superior to the CT scan on the
attribute of radiation exposure. This suggests that radiation exposure is far
more likely to be an attribute considered by a patient if she is given the
choice between a CT scan, an MRI scan, and no imaging test than if she is
merely given the choice between a CT scan and no imaging test.
Closely related to the evaluability problem is that individuals often com-
pare complex alternatives on the basis of the attributes that are easiest to
compare. As a result, people tend to favor alternatives that dominate others
on one comparable feature (trade-off contrast) or select alternatives that
seem to lie in between others on a distribution (extremeness aversion).54
The trade-off contrast effect causes decisionmakers to give more weight
than is justified to an alternative that clearly dominates a second, as com-
pared to a third, alternative whose comparative value is more ambiguous;
the fact that the chosen alternative dominates another is seen as a good
reason for choosing it.55 For example, imagine a condition for which there
51. Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Re-
versals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 Organizational Behav. &
Hum. Decision Processes 247, 248 (1996).
52. Id.
53. See P.C. Shrimpton et al., Doses from Computed Tomography (CT) Examina-
tions in the UK—2003 Review 31 (2005), available at http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/
HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1194947420292.
54. Bettman et al., supra note 38, at 207; Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-
Dependent Preferences, 39 Mgmt. Sci. 1179, 1183, 1186–87 (1993).
55. Bettman et al., supra note 38, at 207; Joel Huber et al., Adding Asymmetrically Domi-
nated Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis, 9 J. Consumer Res.
90 (1982). This situation is known as “asymmetric dominance.” Bettman et al., supra note 38,
at 198.
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are two possible treatments, one involving surgery and one not, that differ
on a variety of attributes (i.e., price, mortality risk, likely quality of life, etc.),
making comparison difficult. The likelihood of the patient choosing the sur-
gical option would almost certainly increase if a second surgical option that
is inferior to the first on all relevant attributes were added to the choice set.
Effectively, at least some decisionmakers faced with the difficult decision—
surgical option #1 or the nonsurgical option—would reduce the cost of
decisionmaking by solving the easier problem of whether surgical option #1
is preferable to surgical option #2.
The extremeness aversion effect suggests that a decisionmaker is more
likely to prefer Choice B to Choice A if he also considers a Choice C that has
opposite benefits and costs to Choice A. For example, assume that a patient’s
choice between two diagnostic tests is difficult because Test A costs $1,000
but identifies a potentially dangerous condition 95% of the time when it
exists, whereas Test B identifies the condition only 85% of the time but costs
only $250. If Test C, which costs $100 but will only identify the condition
25% of the time, is also considered, the likelihood of the patient choosing
Test B will increase.
Decisionmaking strategies such as these lead to what has been called
“coherent arbitrariness.”56 The outcomes are locally reasonable given the in-
formation that decisionmakers compare, but they can result in inaccurate
decisions because logically relevant information is omitted from the deci-
sionmaking analysis.
4. Emotion-Laden Decisions
The more difficult it is to compare attributes, the more likely it is that
decisionmakers will adopt choice strategies that are noncompensatory. Trad-
ing off one attribute against a different type of attribute can be difficult not
only cognitively but also emotionally. This is especially likely to be the case
when individuals believe that deeply held values are at stake that are diffi-
cult, or even morally improper, to sacrifice.57 In such situations, in order to
avoid negative emotions, individuals often employ simple, noncompensa-
tory decisionmaking strategies that allow them to avoid confronting such
fraught trade-offs.58 For example, research has indicated that certain individ-
uals express a reluctance to consent to any actions that will result in environ-
mental degradation, even if permitting the action could generate enough
money to pay for more than a compensating amount of environmental
protection.59
56. Dan Ariely et al., “Coherent Arbitrariness”: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable
Preferences, 118 Q. J. Econ. 73 (2003).
57. See Bettman et al., supra note 38, at 196.
58. Id. at 197.
59. Jonathan Baron & Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 Organizational Behav. &
Hum. Decision Processes 1, 13 (1997).
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In the health care context, individuals are likely to feel extremely un-
comfortable trading off medical interventions against money, even though
we all make decisions in our everyday lives that demonstrate that we do not
place infinite value on avoiding morbidity or mortality—for example, by
purchasing cars that do not have the highest possible safety ratings in order
to save money or obtain other desirable features. When faced with illness,
however, many patients are likely to employ simple decisionmaking strate-
gies that allow them to avoid confronting such trade-offs, even though doing
so might reduce the accuracy of decisions. As insurance law experts Tom
Baker and Peter Siegelman write,
shopping for a health care service on the basis of price strikes so many
people as bizarre, even a bit repugnant, and . . . the idea of negotiating over
a fee with a physician is, quite literally, unimaginable for many people. . . .
[O]ur sense is that many people experience discomfort in thinking about
. . . health care in relation to money and, thus, would be willing to pay at
least something extra to avoid that.60
C. Empirical Research on Medical Decisionmaking
It is almost always difficult to determine whether a particular decision is
an accurate reflection of an individual’s deeply held values, since there is no
foolproof way of eliciting what exactly those values are or how they compare
to one another. But, consistent with the theoretical account above, the ex-
isting empirical research on decisionmaking in the medical care context pro-
vides substantial circumstantial evidence that, contrary to the assumption of
CDHC proponents, patients are unlikely to do a very good job of making
efficient medical care decisions at the point of treatment.
Studies do suggest that patients are more conservative about seeking
medical care when they are forced to spend their own dollars on that care.61
Thus, the fundamental prediction of microeconomic theory that demand
falls as price rises is borne out in the medical care context. This indicates, as
supporters of CDHC like to argue, that CDHC would probably encourage
healthy price competition among providers of medical care.62 One consistent
60. Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Law and Economics After the Behavioral Turn: Learn-
ing from Insurance, Harv. L. Petrie-Flom Center, 48 (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/petrie-flom/workshop/pdf/baker.pdf.
61. See, e.g., Paul Fronstin & Sara R. Collins, Findings from the 2007 EBRI/Com-




62. See, e.g., Cannon & Tanner, supra note 14, at 6–11.
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finding, dating back to the well-known RAND study,63 however, is that pa-
tients demand less care when faced with increasing marginal costs64 but do
not do well at distinguishing between high- and low-value interventions.65
For example, studies have found that patients with higher cost-sharing obli-
gations economize by not taking prescription drugs only to have “higher
rates of serious adverse events[ ] and . . . emergency department visits,” the
costs of which offset any prior savings.66
Scholars have also found that, when choosing between treatments, pa-
tients’ revealed preferences are often inconsistent over time.67 Although it is
possible that experience causes patients to change their deeply held and well-
considered preferences, these results suggest that medical care preferences
can be highly unstable and thus subject to contextual effects.
Research also documents evidence of a high degree of one-reason deci-
sionmaking when patients consider treatment options for serious ailments
that would seem to warrant a more careful comparison of multiple attrib-
utes. One study of treatment choices made by dialysis patients, for example,
concludes that many patients seem to opt for hemodialysis when hearing a
dispiriting fact about peritoneal dialysis but choose peritoneal dialysis when
hearing about a single undesirable consequence of hemodialysis.68
Finally, but importantly, average functional health literacy in the United
States is extremely low. A shockingly large percentage of the population is
only marginally literate and functionally innumerate,69 suggesting a likely
inability to understand, let alone make a reasoned choice between, treatment
options with different risks, likelihoods of success, and morbidity and mor-
tality consequences. Documents often provided for the express purpose of
facilitating informed decisionmaking in similar contexts—such as privacy
disclosure forms used by academic medical centers—have been evaluated as
far too difficult for the average patient to comprehend.70 And very few pa-
tients are familiar with even relatively basic features of their health insurance
63. See Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care:
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 251 (1987).
64. See id. at 258; Baicker & Goldman, supra note 22, at 55 (calling this finding of the
RAND study “remarkably resilient in [similar] studies over time”).
65. See Manning et al., supra note 63, at 265–66; Baicker & Goldman, supra note 22, at
65 (concluding that increasing patient cost sharing at the point of service “would reduce use of
both low-value and high-value services”).
66. Peter J. Neumann et al., Do Drug Formulary Policies Reflect Evidence of Value?, 12
Am. J. Managed Care 30, 30 (2006); see also John Hsu et al., Unintended Consequences of Caps
on Medicare Drug Benefits, 354 New Eng. J. Med. 2349, 2356 (2006).
67. See, e.g., Terri R. Fried et al., Inconsistency over Time in the Preferences of Older
Persons with Advanced Illness for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 55 J. Am. Geriatrics Soc’y 1007
(2007).
68. Carl E. Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Med-
ical Decisions 94–95 (1998).
69. See Schneider & Hall, supra note 40, at 36–38.
70. Steven Walfish & Keely M. Watkins, Readability Level of Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act Notices of Privacy Practices Utilized by Academic Medical Centers, 28
Evaluation & Health Professions 479 (2005); see also Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et al.,
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plans,71 which suggests that they will also likely fail to understand relevant
features of alternative medical interventions.
III. Medical Providers as Decisionmaking Agents
Part II argued that there is a strong theoretical and empirical basis for
believing that most patients will not be very good at making medical care
decisions that equate marginal cost with marginal benefit at the point of
service, thus ensuring that resources are efficiently allocated between medi-
cal care and competing goods and services. One potential solution to this
problem is for patients to rely heavily on, or even completely delegate deci-
sionmaking responsibility to, better informed agents—namely, physicians or
other medical care providers.
Evidence strongly suggests that many patients would prefer for their
physicians to make treatment decisions for them.72 One study reports that
78 percent of colorectal patients and 52 percent of breast cancer patients
register such a preference.73 A broader study of medical decisionmaking in
hypothetical settings finds that, on a scale of 1 to 100, with “1” indicating no
desire to make medical decisions and “100” indicating an intense desire to
do so, the average patient registered a score of only “33.” The average score
is even lower for patients with more severe illnesses.74
Even when patients make treatment decisions, as informed consent law
requires, a large number of patients employ the simple heuristic of adopting
their physician’s recommendation.75 This strategy is particularly attractive to
hospitalized patients who face even more serious obstacles to obtaining and
processing information than outpatients.76 This fact suggests that, rather
than providing incentives for consumers to make more efficient cost–benefit
trade-offs at the point of treatment, perhaps consideration should be paid to
giving physicians the incentive to incorporate cost–benefit trade-offs into
their treatment recommendations.
Readability Standards for Informed-Consent Forms as Compared with Actual Readability, 348
New Eng. J. Med. 721 (2003).
71. See Peter J. Cunningham et al., Do Consumers Know How Their Health Plan Works?,
Health Aff., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 159; Deborah W. Garnick et al., How Well Do Americans
Understand Their Health Coverage?, Health Aff., Fall 1993, at 204.
72. See Schneider & Hall, supra note 40, at 47 (“The evidence that patients do not long
to make medical decisions is compelling.”).
73. Kinta Beaver et al., Decision-Making Role Preferences and Information Needs: A Com-
parison of Colorectal and Breast Cancer, 2 Health Expectations 266, 266 (1999).
74. Jack Ende et al., Measuring Patients’ Desire for Autonomy: Decision Making and In-
formation-Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients, 4 J. Gen. Internal Med. 23, 26–27
(1989).
75. For a compelling example described by a patient facing a complicated set of options
for treating breast cancer, see Ann Kim, Dr. Me: Cancer Patients Want a Say, but Do We Have
to Be the Doctor, Too?, Zocalo Pub. Square (May 16, 2012), http://zocalopublicsquare.org/
thepublicsquare/2012/05/16/dr-me/read/nexus/.
76. See Schneider & Hall, supra note 40, at 31.
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Delegating decisionmaking authority to agents, however, can only ra-
tionalize the provision of medical care if the agents are motivated to recom-
mend no more than efficient levels of treatment. It would be difficult to
structure the financial incentives of providers appropriately for this task.
More importantly, though, if the economically proper incentives can be de-
signed, those incentives would create a conflict of interest between physi-
cians and patients and work at cross-purposes with engrained professional
norms of physician culture.
A. Provider Financial Incentives
Many scholars believe that a key driver of the inefficient overallocation
of resources to medical care is that most providers are compensated on a
“piece-work” basis.77 Specifically, under standard compensation arrange-
ments with public and private insurers, doctors typically earn more money
the more diagnostic tests or procedures they perform. This creates a moral
hazard similar to the one that affects the incentives faced by patients them-
selves.78 In theory, the provider moral hazard problem is even worse than
the patient moral hazard problem discussed in Part II. Whereas patients
have the private incentive to demand all tests and treatments with a positive
expected value net of nonfinancial costs, providers have a profit incentive to
recommend even tests and treatments that have a negative expected value to
the patient!
The risk of malpractice lawsuits creates another incentive for physicians
to recommend more than the efficient amount of medical care, a problem
often labeled “defensive medicine.”79 Physicians have an incentive to over-
treat—particularly in the form of prescribing diagnostic tests with high costs
and low expected benefits—if it will reduce the perceived likelihood that
they will later be sued,80 especially when there is little or no risk that the
treatment will affirmatively harm the patient (which could also lead to a
lawsuit).
Not all provider compensation mechanisms produce an incentive for
the overutilization of care, but those that do not usually create a private
incentive for providers to recommend too little care, rather than the efficient
amount. Some physicians (usually primary care physicians) who practice in
77. See, e.g., Orszag & Ellis, supra note 24, at 1794 (“Fee-for-service reimbursement
remains the predominant form of payment in private insurance and Medicare.”); Schneider &
Hall, supra note 40, at 31 (“[W]e got to consumerism because doctors had little reason to
control costs and much reason to drive them up. The more services doctors sold and the more
they charged for a service, the wealthier they got.”).
78. See Orszag & Ellis, supra note 24, at 1794; cf. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum:
What a Texas Town Can Teach Us About Health Care, New Yorker, June 1, 2009, at 36, 36–37
(providing strong anecdotal evidence of overtreatment of patients in McAllen, Texas).
79. See Richard E. Anderson, Commentary, Billions for Defense: The Pervasive Nature of
Defensive Medicine, 159 Archives Internal Med. 2399, 2399 (1999).
80. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 26, at 558–59 (citing estimates that defensive
medicine costs the U.S. health care system between $45 billion and $200 billion a year).
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“health maintenance organization” (“HMO”) structures receive a capitated
monthly payment for each patient they serve regardless of whether that pa-
tient utilizes resources.81 Others who work in staff-model physician networks
are paid a flat salary.82 Still others receive bonus payments for minimizing
costly referrals.83 These arrangements create a financial incentive for provid-
ers to offer too little care because each quantum of care is costly to the
physician in either time or money and provides no private benefit, no mat-
ter how beneficial the intervention may be to the patient.
The incentive problems with standard physician compensation mecha-
nisms have led some scholars to recommend “pay-for-performance” com-
pensation structures, which would compensate physicians based on the
outcomes their patients experience.84 Enormous geographical deviations in
care,85 high rates of avoidable injuries,86 and physicians’ widespread failure
to follow evidence-based clinical guidelines87 make it clear that medical care
is often ineffective or dangerous. Outcome-based pay would provide physi-
cians and medical care institutions with an incentive to improve quality of
81. See generally Samuel H. Zuvekas & Steven C. Hill, Does Capitation Matter? Impacts
on Access, Use, and Quality, 41 Inquiry 316 (2004).
82. In the most famous of these, Kaiser Permanente, the HMO contracts with multis-
pecialty physician groups, which pay physicians on a salary basis. See Ginny McPartland,
Southern California Pediatrician’s Career Parallels KP’s Quest for Best, Kaiser Permanente
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://kaiserpermanentehistory.org/latest/southern-california-pediatrician%
E2%80%99s-career-parallels-kp%E2%80%99s-quest-for-best/.
83. See Begoña Garcia Mariñoso & Izabela Jelovac, GPs’ Payment Contracts and Their
Referral Practice, 22 J. Health Econ. 617, 619 (2003); see also Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625,
627 (8th Cir. 1997).
84. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay for: Result-Based
Compensation for Health Care, 58 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1427, 1446–48 (2001). Most propo-
nents of outcome-based payments believe that such payments should be adjusted for patient-
specific health indicators, so that physicians will not try to avoid sicker patients who, because
they are sick, are likely to experience worse outcomes on average. Hyman and Silver provoca-
tively suggest that physicians should be compensated based on non-risk-adjusted outcomes to
incentivize them to screen out patients unlikely to benefit from treatment, much the same way
that contingent-fee plaintiff lawyers screen out weak cases from litigation. Id. at 1466–67.
Although the approach could help reduce the provision of inefficient care, the problem is that
it will be efficient to provide many treatments ex ante even for patients less likely than others
to enjoy good outcomes. By rendering this group of patients less profitable, Hyman’s sugges-
tion would likely lead to one of two results: if payments to physicians are low, many unhealthy
patients for whom treatment would still be cost-justified would be unable to obtain care; if
physician reimbursements were high enough that doctors would still be willing to treat the
relatively sick for whom treatment was efficient, doctors who cherry picked the relatively
wealthy would be grossly overcompensated, thus encouraging providers to spend more time
screening for more profitable patients and less time actually treating.
85. See, e.g., Elliott S. Fisher & John E. Wennberg, Health Care Quality, Geographic
Variations, and the Challenge of Supply-Sensitive Care, 46 Persp. Biology & Med. 69, 77
(2003) (summarizing research on geographic variation of care within the United States).
86. See, e.g., Inst. of Med., To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System 26
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
87. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults
in the United States, 348 New Eng. J. Med. 2635, 2643–44 (2003).
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care: to invest more effort in learning what treatments are most effective and
in avoiding medical errors and iatrogenic injury. If outcome-based pay
would provide an impetus for increased quality, this mechanism would be a
step toward more efficient resource allocation. Pay-for-performance com-
pensation would eliminate the financial incentive that providers have to pro-
vide completely useless—and even potentially harmful—tests and
treatments because such activities would not increase provider compensa-
tion. Unnecessary and affirmatively dangerous interventions would fail any
cost–benefit test.
Unfortunately, outcome-based compensation would do little to mitigate
the physician moral hazard problem unless it adjusted for the cost of achiev-
ing particular outcomes. Pay-for-performance compensation would still in-
centivize physicians to recommend all care with a positive expected value,
regardless of its cost, as long as they did not personally bear that cost. Pay-
for-performance compensation could produce its desired incentive effect
only if a physician who ordered a treatment program internalized all related
costs: medical support staff, assistance from other medical specialists, tests,
prescription drugs, etc. Legislative encouragement for Accountable Care Or-
ganizations (“ACOs”), included in the ACA,88 edges in this direction by cre-
ating incentives for the formation of provider groups that would bear all the
costs of a patient’s care.89
B. The Problems with Even Economically Optimal Physician Incentives
The successful development of ACOs, or similar institutional structures,
would create a different problem. Compensating cost-effective medicine in
such a world would incentivize physicians to break trust with their pa-
tients.90 A patient with a contractual right to all “medically necessary” care,
as almost all health insurance policies promise,91 would presumably want his
physician to recommend the most effective treatment, whatever its cost.
This conflict of interest would create its own set of secondary incentive
problems. Patients would eventually learn which doctors were recom-
mending all efficacious treatments that would be covered by insurance and
which doctors were responding to payment incentives to promote only cost-
justified interventions. Assuming that patients could distinguish the pay-
ment-focused physicians from the patient-focused physicians, the former
group would have a difficult time attracting patients in the long run. Pay-
for-performance compensation would thus likely create a marketing prob-
lem, in addition to an ethical problem, for physicians.
88. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat.
119, 395 (2010).
89. See Health Policy Brief: Next Steps for ACOs, Health Aff., 2 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://
healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_61.pdf.
90. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Hippocratic Myth 108 (2011) (calling it “betrayal”
for doctors to take money for not pursuing pricey treatment options and “toxic to the doc-
tor–patient relationship”).
91. See infra Section IV.A.1.
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Assuming that health insurance policies continue to cover all medically
indicated care that is not specifically excluded, physicians who failed to iden-
tify the most effective treatment might also run a legal liability risk. Even if
the treatment provided did not constitute malpractice, a failure to disclose
high-cost but effective treatments could run afoul of informed consent or
even fiduciary duty principles.92 For example, a physician who recommends
to a patient a much cheaper but slightly less efficacious treatment would
invite a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty.93 Insurers who sold coverage
based on a “medically necessary” contractual standard and then incentivized
physicians to recommend or provide less care could also be subject to tort
and breach of contract claims.94
Furthermore, a pay-for-performance structure could only rationalize
the allocation of resources to medical care on the assumption that physician
utility functions are based solely on their financial self-interest. This pro-
position would strike all but the most unreconstructed of neoclassical econ-
omists devoted to rational choice theory as extremely unlikely on its face.
There is little doubt that physicians, like other members of society, pre-
fer more wealth to less and are motivated to respond to financial incentives.
But it has long been recognized that professional culture also matters in
treatment decisions.95 And the professional culture of physicians, beginning
with the Hippocratic oath, emphasizes a duty to do everything possible to
heal individual patients.96 In contrast, the professional culture of medicine is
notoriously resistant to cost-effectiveness principles97 or, more generally, to
92. In Pegram v. Herdrich, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a breach of fiduciary duty
claim against an HMO physician whose patient suffered a burst appendix after the delay of a
diagnostic test, on the ground that the cause of action was duplicative of the plaintiff’s mal-
practice claim. 530 U.S. 211, 214–18 (2000). Some judges, however, have recognized the possi-
bility that the self-interested treatment recommendations that physicians provide could run
afoul of fiduciary obligations even while falling short of malpractice. See, e.g., Neade v. Portes,
739 N.E.2d 496, 506–08 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, J., dissenting).
93. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483–85 (Cal. 1990) (dis-
cussing breach of fiduciary duty claims against physicians based on the physician’s undisclosed
financial interests). But see Neade, 739 N.E.2d at 502–03 (arguing that breach of fiduciary duty
claims are duplicative of informed consent and medical malpractice); D.A.B. v. Brown, 570
N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that lawsuit related to “kickbacks” received
by physician sounded in medical malpractice rather than breach of fiduciary duty).
94. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that HMO’s failure
to disclose financial incentive plan was a breach of fiduciary duty); see also Weiss v. CIGNA
Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that HMO’s prevention of physi-
cians from advising patients of appropriate treatment plans was a breach of fiduciary duty but
that providing financial incentives to physicians in order to ration care did not violate a fiduci-
ary duty and that HMO’s fiduciary duty imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act (“ERISA”) did not require disclosure of the incentive practice).
95. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,
53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941, 961–62 (1963).
96. See Schneider & Hall, supra note 40, at 32–33 (discussing the professional norm of
“Hippocratic individualism”).
97. See id. at 33–34 (“[F]oregoing care to conserve costs conflicts with much that is
elemental in the training and culture of doctors.”).
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serving the collective needs of the community as a whole at the expense of
identifiable individuals.98 Inculcation into this professional culture means
that a large number of physicians will do everything possible to help indi-
vidual patients, even if interventions are not cost-effective according to a
global standard of efficient resource allocation.99 This is likely to be true
even when doing so would affect physicians’ paychecks, at least within
limits.100
Changing the structure of physician payments can help reduce the cost
of medical care, and thus improve efficiency, if it can incentivize physicians
to stop recommending completely ineffective or dangerous care. But focus-
ing only on physician financial incentives is not likely to reduce care that has
a positive expected benefit but is not cost-effective.
IV. Relative Value Health Insurance
Rather than hoping against evidence that patients will be able to make
optimal resource-allocation decisions at the point of service or offering fi-
nancial incentives to physicians to break trust with their patients, a better
approach to rationalizing the amount of resources allocated to medical care
would be to facilitate patient contracting for different depths of medical care
when purchasing insurance coverage, before treatment is needed. I call in-
surance coverage fashioned in this way “relative value health insurance”
(“RVHI”). Patients who wish to devote relatively fewer resources to medical
care and more to competing goods and services could purchase relatively
shallow insurance that covers only the most cost-effective medical interven-
tions; patients who wish to devote relatively more resources to medical care
could purchase insurance that would cover increasingly less cost-effective
interventions.
For this ex ante, contractual approach to succeed, however, careful at-
tention must be paid to the choice architecture of the decisionmaking pro-
cess. Complex information concerning what medical interventions would
and would not be covered by different insurance products must be presented
in a way that is tractable enough to enable boundedly rational consumers to
make purchasing decisions that reflect their individualized preferences for
98. See Bloche, supra note 90, at 10.
99. See Avraham, supra note 26, at 561 (calling overtreatment resulting from a good-
faith desire to do everything possible to help patients “[c]ost-apathetic medicine”). Even cost-
apathetic physicians are implicitly somewhat sensitive to cost, as extremely expensive tests and
treatments with very little benefit will often fail to become a part of customary practice. Cf.
Bloche, supra note 90, at 40 (noting that an expensive breast MRI is considered appropriate
only for patients with a high risk of breast cancer, even though, in theory, the test could
provide some positive expected value for low-risk patients).
100. The size of the effect would undoubtedly be sensitive to the significance of the
personal cost involved. A reasonable hypothesis seems to be that physicians satisfice, emphasiz-
ing additional income until they reach a target level but then valuing other goods. See Richard
G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics, in Behavioral Economics and Its
Applications 195, 197–99 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartianinen eds., 2007).
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allocating their resources between medical care and other goods and ser-
vices. This function can be satisfied by the government better facilitating
private contracting for health insurance by producing and analyzing com-
parative effectiveness research, using funding already provided by the ACA
as a starting point.
A. The Legal Status of Relative Value Health Insurance
1. Limitations on Ex Post Utilization Review
An important feature of the “managed care” revolution in the provision
of medical care, which reached its high-water mark in the 1990s,101 was the
widespread institution by health insurance companies of “utilization re-
view.” With medical care cost exploding and nearly all health insurance con-
tracts written to cover “medically necessary” care,102 insurance contracts
began to require that the insurer pre-approve certain interventions to ensure
that the prospective procedures were, in fact, medically necessary. Through
utilization review, insurers became willing to deny coverage to policyholders
for treatments recommended by their physicians, a practice that was exceed-
ingly rare prior to the rise of managed care.103
As part of the public backlash against managed care cost-containment
efforts,104 forty-four states and the District of Columbia enacted “external
review” statutes,105 which give patients the right to challenge an insurer’s
medical necessity-based denials of care in a quasi-judicial procedure.106 Pre-
vailing patients are entitled to an order requiring the insurer to provide or
pay for the requested treatment.107 In most jurisdictions, external reviewers
determine medical necessity de novo and based on a statutory definition of
medical necessity, rather than merely applying an insurer’s definition of the
term (if the insurer even defines the term, which insurers often do not).108
101. See Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in
Health Care, 6 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 93, 121 (2006) (noting that from 1992 to
1998, enrollment in “managed care” forms of health insurance increased by over 50 percent).
102. See E. Haavi Morreim, Holding Health Care Accountable 47 (2001).
103. See Bloche, supra note 90, at 105.
104. See Mark A. Hall, State Regulation of Medical Necessity: The Case of Weight-Reduc-
tion Surgery, 53 Duke L.J. 653, 664 (2003) (identifying from interviews that “public backlash”
is one reason for insurers becoming “ ‘managed care lite’—i.e., scaling back on the list of
procedures that require medical necessity review prior to treatment”).
105. An Update on State External Review Programs, 2006, AHIP Center for Pol’y &
Res., app. B at 8 (July 2008), www.ahip.org/PDFs/StateExternalReviewReport.pdf.
106. The breadth of these statutes varies, but all permit patients to challenge treatment
requests declined on the basis that they were not medically necessary. Hunter, supra note 101,
at 129. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the enforceability of these statutes when they were
challenged as preempted by the federal ERISA regime. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,
536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002).
107. Hunter, supra note 101, at 136.
108. See Hall, supra note 104, at 666 (“[F]or the most part, insurers . . . cannot enforce
[individualized medical necessity standards] when a case goes to external review . . . .”). A
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According to most statutory definitions, medical necessity depends entirely
on whether a treatment has any clinical efficacy, regardless of the magnitude
of the benefit. The relevant standards rarely include any hint of cost–benefit
balancing or consideration of cost-effectiveness, except to the extent that a
treatment is not considered “medically necessary” if there is an equally effi-
cacious treatment available (presumably at a lower price).109 Consequently,
health insurers have little if any legal space to mitigate moral hazard by re-
fusing to cover low value treatments at the point of service.
Consistent with this legal structure, health insurers now generally pay
for any treatment recommended by a treating physician that offers the po-
tential for any positive clinical benefit unless explicitly excluded from the
contractual scope of coverage.110 When insurers do deny a physician’s treat-
ment proposal and subsequently defend their position to external review
boards, the issue is nearly always either whether the disputed treatment is at
all effective for treating the patient’s condition111 or whether a requested
procedure is cosmetic or lifestyle-related rather than medical in nature.112
Bariatric surgery, breast reduction surgery, Viagra prescriptions, residential
care, and power-operated wheelchairs are frequent subjects of dispute. The
available evidence suggests that it is now rare for a private insurer to refuse
to cover a physician-recommended treatment with expected clinical benefits
handful of state statutes instruct the reviewer to apply the insurer’s standard. See Alaska Stat.
§ 21.07.050(d)(1) (2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-2537(E) (2013); Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-
22a15(c) (Supp. 2012); Or. Rev. Stat. § 743.862(2) (2011); Wis. Stat. Ann. 632.835(3m)
(West 2004 & Supp. 2012).
109. California’s statute, for example, states that medical necessity must be determined
based on the evidence of a service’s effectiveness, expert opinion, standards of medical prac-
tice, and a treatment’s likelihood of providing a benefit to the patient for which other treat-
ments are not clinically effective. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1374.33(b) (West Supp.
2013). North Carolina appears to be one exception to this trend. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-3-
200(b) (2011).
110. Hall, supra note 104, at 655, 658, 671 (“Insurers have largely abandoned their
direct attempts to limit the utilization rate for most medical procedures.”); see also Peter J.
Neumann, Using Cost-Effectiveness Analysis to Improve Health Care 24 (2005).
111. Even denials on this basis are risky in light of external review statutes that impose a
relatively low standard of proof on the patient. Gregg Bloche describes a recent HealthNet plan
denial of a physician-recommended unusual treatment on the ground that there was insuffi-
cient proof of its efficacy. Bloche, supra note 90, at 21, 28 (footnote omitted). The denial was
subsequently overturned on independent review notwithstanding Bloche’s analysis that the
scientific basis for the treatment included “flawed studies published in second-line journals
. . . . [with] methodological deficiencies [that] left lots of room for quibbling.” Id.
112. E.g., Hall, supra note 104, at 658 (“Medical necessity review is now taking place
mainly at the margins, focusing on treatments that might be considered cosmetic, custodial, or
lifestyle enhancing rather than medically indicated.”). Bariatric surgery, breast reduction sur-
gery, Viagra prescriptions, residential care, and power-operated wheelchairs are frequent sub-
jects of dispute. See, e.g., Carole Roan Gresenz & David M. Studdert, External Review of
Coverage Denials by Managed Care Organizations in California, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud.
449, 457 tbl.1 (2005) (breaking down California external review challenges by service type); see
also Hall, supra note 104, at 655–62 (discussing the dispute over bariatric surgery across
jurisdictions).
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that is not specifically excluded by contractual language on the ground that
the treatment is not cost-justified.113
There is a strong public policy justification for limiting the ability of
insurance companies to deny coverage through utilization review conducted
at the point of treatment. Insurance companies that sell mid-quality health
care at a mid-range price could plausibly use the utilization review process
to deny even mid-quality medical care to their customers. If permitted the
discretion to judge “medical necessity” after receiving customers’ premium
dollars, insurance companies would face a clear conflict of interest: the more
treatments they deny, the more dollars would flow to their bottom lines.114
Put another way, aggressive ex post utilization review could mitigate patient
moral hazard but at the cost of creating insurer moral hazard; insurers have
an incentive to provide too little medical care because they benefit from cost
savings while patients bear much of the cost of not receiving treatments.
This type of moral hazard is typically mitigated in markets by the desire
of sellers to please their customers and earn repeat business.115 For example,
an automobile manufacturer’s desire for a previous customer to return
when it is time to buy his next car limits its incentive to cut costs on the
assembly line. A company that advertises high-quality cars and delivers lem-
ons will not win much repeat business. But the market force that limits
moral hazard is weaker in health insurance markets. Because the profitability
of serving a customer depends on how much medical care he demands in a
given year, and because the correlation between the cost of caring for a pa-
tient in one year and in future years is positive, an insurance company’s
bottom line will often benefit if customers who ask for expensive treatments
this year decide to take their business elsewhere in the future.116
Although understandable, the legal limits placed on utilization review
by external review laws have the unfortunate consequence of requiring con-
sumers to purchase “Cadillac”-quality health care at a Cadillac price, even if
they would prefer to purchase “Chevrolet”-quality health care at a more
modest price.117 This limitation of options works out well for two groups:
wealthy individuals who are able to purchase deep medical care coverage
without liquidity constraints forcing them to skimp on other highly valued
goods services, and those consumers who place a particularly high subjective
value on even marginally beneficial health care compared to the other goods
and services that they might have to forgo because medical care consumes so
113. Neumann, supra note 110, at 25.
114. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 35
(1999).
115. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Un-
conscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1240 (2003).
116. Korobkin, supra note 114, at 40–41.
117. Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care Choices: Private Contracts as Instru-
ments of Health Reform 5 (1995).
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much of their income. External review laws have the consequence of requir-
ing consumers who would prefer cheaper and less comprehensive coverage
to buy deeper coverage than they wish to purchase or go without any cover-
age at all. With the new ACA “individual mandate,” most people who
choose the latter option will now be fined.118
2. Ex Ante Exclusions
The legal limitations on point-of-treatment utilization review by insur-
ers contrast starkly with the fact that, in most cases, insurers may legally
refuse to pay for interventions that are explicitly excluded by the insurance
contract.119 A patchwork of state “mandated benefits” laws requires insurers
to cover specified categories of treatments.120 Pre-ACA federal law includes a
handful of private insurance treatment mandates,121 and the ACA requires
that a set of minimum benefits be included in all insurance policies sold in
the individual and small-group markets.122 Beyond these mandates, however,
insurers may legally exclude specified interventions from coverage, and
courts routinely uphold their right to do so as a matter of freedom of
contract.123
Many insurance plans come with pharmaceutical “formularies,” for ex-
ample, whereby drugs in more favored coverage “tiers” require lower patient
copayments, and drugs in less favored tiers require higher copayments or are
even excluded from coverage altogether.124 Using an emerging practice
known as value-based insurance design (“VBID”),125 insurance companies
118. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat.
119, 242 (2010) (titled “Requirement to maintain minimal essential coverage”).
119. See Hall, supra note 104, at 669 (noting that the exclusion of specific treatments
succeeds by “keep[ing] the issue away from external reviewers”).
120. Employer-sponsored self-funded health plans, in which the employer retains the
risk rather than purchasing third-party insurance, are exempt from state-level benefits man-
dates as a consequence of the preemptive effects of ERISA. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle
over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves Another”, 5 Yale J. Health
Pol’y L. & Ethics 89, 89 (2005).
121. For example, private insurance policies must cover the cost of new mothers spend-
ing forty-eight hours in the hospital postpartum and ninety-six hours following a Cesarean-
section delivery. Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (2006).
122. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302, 124 Stat.
119, 163 (2010).
123. There are known examples of neutrals hearing appeals of treatment denials under
state external review laws ordering an insurer to cover a treatment deemed “medically neces-
sary” even though it is clearly excluded from coverage by the policy. See Gresenz & Studdert,
supra note 112, at 464–65. These decisions, however, are clearly outliers and are not justified
by external review statutes themselves. Hall, supra note 104, at 667–68.
124. See Neumann et al., supra note 66, at 30–31 (describing this phenomenon and
observing that a Boston health insurance program assigns medications to one of three tiers,
with Tier Three drugs either requiring the highest copayment or being excluded from coverage
altogether).
125. See Michael E. Chernew et al., Value-Based Insurance Design, Health Aff., w195
(Jan. 30, 2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/2/w195.full.pdfťml.
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and self-insured employers have experimented with offering reduced or even
zero copayments for prescription drugs that, when taken as directed, are
particularly likely to reduce future health care costs.126 And, of course, health
insurers can and do limit coverage to care provided by hospitals and physi-
cians within their provider network or require greater cost sharing if a pa-
tient chooses to go “out of network” for treatment.127 By limiting drug
formularies and practitioner networks to those drugs and providers offering
insurers the greatest discounts, insurers can try to use bargaining leverage to
negotiate lower prices for covered services.
Against this background, there is no impediment, in theory, to insurers
excluding from coverage treatments that fail to satisfy a cost–benefit test, as
long as the exclusions can be adequately specified at the time of contracting.
Further, there is no impediment to insurers offering multiple products,
priced differently, that exclude from coverage specifically enumerated cate-
gories of care.
B. The Information Problem
If insurance companies may legally sell health insurance that covers only
cost-effective treatments, why does no such product exist in the market-
place? The primary impediment to the sale of health insurance that covers
only cost-effective interventions appears to be the difficulty of adequately
specifying the relevant coverage exclusions ex ante.128 There are three related
problems:
First, there is very little solid information about even the basic effective-
ness of most medical interventions—according to some estimates, there is
scientific evidence for the efficacy of less than half the treatments doctors
recommend.129 Even clinical practice guidelines are notoriously based on
consensus opinion rather than scientific fact.130 There is even less informa-
tion about the comparative effectiveness of alternative plausible interven-
tions.131 Even when the law requires a treatment, such as a new
pharmaceutical, to obtain regulatory approval before being marketed, its
126. See, e.g., Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Assessing the Evidence for Value-Based Insur-
ance Design, 29 Health Aff. 1988, 1990–91 (2010).
127. See, e.g., Peter R. Kongstvedt, The Managed Health Care Handbook 31 (4th
ed. 2001).
128. See Neumann, supra note 110, at 145 (noting that “practical limits on the details
specified in contracts” impede insurers contracting with patients from considering cost-effec-
tiveness as part of coverage decisions); Baicker & Goldman, supra note 22, at 52 (“[I]t is
impossible to write down contingent contracts that cover the infinite array of health
outcomes.”).
129. Inst. of Med., Learning What Works Best: The Nation’s Need for Evidence
on Comparative Effectiveness in Health Care (2007), reprinted in LeighAnne Olsen et
al., Inst. of Med., Learning What Works: Infrastructure Required for Comparative
Effectiveness Research 333, 341 (2011).
130. Saver, supra note 20, at 2172; Pierluigi Tricoci et al., Scientific Evidence Underlying
the ACC/AHA Clinical Practice Guidelines, 301 JAMA 831, 833 (2009).
131. Cf. Saver, supra note 20, at 2150 & n.7.
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producers usually must demonstrate only that it is safe and effective relative
to a placebo rather than comparatively effective vis-à-vis other treatment
options for the same condition. This dearth of information makes it ex-
tremely difficult for any insurer interested in marketing a policy that covers
treatments that satisfy a cost-effectiveness standard to identify ex ante which
treatments are, in fact, cost-effective.
Scholars have long advocated for insurers to contract to provide care
that satisfies a well-specified cost–benefit algorithm, which the insurer
would then apply at the point of treatment.132 This creative idea has fallen
on deaf ears in the marketplace, probably because the lack of good data
would likely subject any insurer’s attempt to apply the algorithm to second-
guessing, charges of moral hazard, and lawsuits.
Second, the measures of marginal effectiveness of competing interven-
tions are dynamic; the measures can change quickly when new effectiveness
data is produced, when new interventions are developed, or when the mar-
ket changes (such as when a drug goes off-patent). Even if an insurer could
fully specify cost-effective interventions at the time of contracting, the lag
time between contracting and use of services would mean that, at the point
of treatment, a policy would cover some no-longer-cost-effective interven-
tions and would not cover some now-cost-effective interventions.
Third, a detailed list of covered and excluded interventions would pro-
vide far too much information for boundedly rational consumers to take
into account at the time of contracting. Consumers have the working mem-
ory to take into account only a handful of attributes when making purchas-
ing decisions, and they almost invariably selectively consider only the most
salient product attributes when bombarded with information.133 Except for
patients with significant preexisting conditions, there would be an extremely
low probability that any potential condition-intervention pair would become
relevant during the policy period. This suggests that consumers are likely to
ignore most detailed coverage information. If consumers did not incorpo-
rate information provided at the time of contracting into their purchase
decisions, the same reverse moral hazard problem associated with post-con-
tractual utilization review would exist: insurers would have a profit incentive
to claim to provide cost-effective care but actually not provide even cost-
effective care.134
C. CER and Relative Value Ratings
These informational impediments that prevent insurers from marketing
insurance policies that cover only cost-effective treatments can only be over-
come with a significant investment in “comparative effectiveness research”
132. See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 117, at 93–96; Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health
Care Morally, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1449, 1502–04 (1994).
133. Korobkin, supra note 115, at 1222–34.
134. Cf. id. at 1234–44 (analyzing the market consequence of consumers not consider-
ing product attributes in their decisionmaking behavior).
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(“CER”). The goal of CER is to provide a firmer scientific understanding of
the relative clinical benefits of competing medical treatments, services, and
interventions.135 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(commonly known as the “stimulus bill”) provided $1.1 billion to three
agencies to conduct CER.136 The ACA doubled down on this investment,
providing $500 million annually beginning in 2013 to 2014.137
The stimulus bill created a federal commission called the “Council for
Comparative Effectiveness Research” to coordinate CER among federal
agencies and tasked the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) with recommending
research priorities.138 The IOM quickly provided a list of 100 “top priority”
topics for CER, including many studies that would explicitly compare alter-
native treatments for common medical conditions.139 The ACA then
changed the administrative structure, replacing the Council with a private
nonprofit organization called the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research In-
stitute (“PCORI”).140 PCORI is now charged with setting CER priorities.141
Its governing board includes government officials and representatives of va-
rious stakeholder groups, such as patients, physicians, insurers, and manu-
facturers of drugs and medical devices, but it is required to ensure peer
review of the research it funds and may appoint expert advisory panels.142
How the information generated by CER is used is critical to its potential
to help rationalize health care spending. One way CER can reduce health
care costs is by supplying providers with better information about which
treatments either do not work at all or provide no marginal benefits relative
to cheaper interventions. As President Obama put the point in 2009, “[I]f
there’s a blue pill and a red pill, and the blue pill is half the price of the red
pill and works just as well, why not pay half price for the thing that’s going
to make you well?”143
135. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6301, 124 Stat.
119, 727 (2010).
136. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 804, 123
Stat. 115; see also Comparative Effectiveness Research Funding, HHS.gov/Recovery, http://
www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
137. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 6301(d)–(e) (2010).
138. See Patrick H. Conway, How the Recovery Act’s Federal Coordinating Council Paved
the Way for the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, 29 Health Aff. 2091, 2091
(2010).
139. Comm. on Comparative Effectiveness Research Prioritization, Inst. of
Med., Initial National Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research 97–138
(2009).
140. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1181(b)(1) (2010).
141. Id. § 1181(d)(1).
142. Id. §§ 1181(d)(4), 1181(d)(7), 1181(f).
143. Transcript: President Obama’s News Conference on Health Reform, Kaiser Health
News (July 22, 2009), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2009/July/22/ObamaTrans-
cript.aspx (providing the transcript of President Obama’s news conference).
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As impeccable as the logic of this point may be, however, eliminating
treatments that have absolutely no marginal benefit is unlikely to signifi-
cantly “bend the curve” of health care costs (that is, reduce the rate of health
care inflation). But CER also has the potential to help reduce the provision
of care that has a positive expected benefit but is not justified by its cost. By
facilitating understanding not just of the absolute effectiveness of treatments
but also of their cost-effectiveness, CER can provide the informational basis
necessary for private insurers to sell RVHI.
For CER to facilitate RVHI, its findings should be used to assign scores
to potential medical interventions for different conditions based on margi-
nal costs and marginal benefits. I call such scores “relative value ratings,”
and I propose that they range from a high score of “1” (extremely cost-
effective) to a low of “10” (not at all cost-effective), although other scales
would be plausible as well. As an illustration of how the ratings scale would
work, consider the following three examples:
* Standard treatment regimens for cardiovascular disease are under-
stood as one of the great success stories of improved medical technology in
the second half of the twentieth century. In 2004, health economist David
Cutler estimated that the expected lifespan of an average forty-five-year-old
would increase by 4.5 years as a result of this technology, at a total cost of
about $30,000.144 This intervention—or set of interventions—would likely
earn the highest possible relative value rating of “1” for patients with rele-
vant symptoms.
* At the other end of the relative value spectrum, consider an interven-
tion that harkens to President Obama’s example of the two different colored
pills with identical effectiveness and radically different prices. According to
an executive of a health insurance company, the brand-name acne medica-
tion, Minocin PAC, retails for $668 per month, which is $618 more than the
generic equivalent. The brand-name product is distinguished only by the
inclusion of an ingredient designed to have a soothing effect on the user’s
skin.145 This medication, which offers a minimal marginal benefit and comes
at a very high cost compared to the alternative, would presumably earn a
relative value rating of “10.”
* In between these examples is lumbar discectomy, a common surgical
procedure for patients with herniated spinal discs.146 In a recent study, 1,191
surgery-eligible patients with herniated discs were randomly assigned to re-
ceive either surgery or nonsurgical medical management. The researchers
measured the benefits (i.e., reduced pain, increased physical mobility) and
costs (direct and indirect, including lost labor productivity) for each group
144. David M. Cutler, Your Money or Your Life: Strong Medicine for
America’s Health Care System 48–56 (2004).
145. This American Life: Someone Else’s Money: One Pill Two Pill, Red Pill Blue Pill
(radio broadcast Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/
episode/392/someone-elses-money?act=1#play.
146. Anna N.A. Tosteson et al., The Cost Effectiveness of Surgical Versus Nonoperative
Treatment for Lumbar Disc Herniation over Two Years, 33 Spine 2108, 2108 (2008).
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for a two-year period.147 The analysis revealed a slight marginal benefit of
surgery, on average, but at a much higher cost. Consequently, the research-
ers calculated that the cost of surgery per marginal “quality-adjusted life
year” (“QALY”) is slightly more than $69,000 for patients younger than age
sixty-five.148 Based on this data, lumbar discectomy for a herniated disc
would likely receive a middling relative value rating—perhaps a “5.”
In a perfect world, all relative value ratings would be based on the re-
sults of randomized, double-blind experiments—the “gold standard” of
medical research.149 Realistically, however, the rating authority would usually
have to rely on less definitive sources of scientific evidence, including retro-
spective analyses of clinical data. Many relative value ratings would apply to
all patients with a particular condition, but different subgroups could re-
ceive different ratings when justified by the best available evidence. For ex-
ample, a particular treatment with a score of “5” for an average patient
might be awarded a score of “3” for patients who have a comorbidity that
makes the treatment more likely to benefit them.
With an established set of relative value ratings issued by an expert
group, whose members would not profit from higher or lower health care
expenditures, insurance companies would be able to contract with patients
for health insurance that pays for care rated at or above a specified relative
value score. A Level 8 policy—i.e., one that covers all interventions rated “8”
or better—would cover a deeper array of treatments than would a Level 3
policy. A Level 8 policy would also cost more, of course. The market would
set the precise difference in price, determined by each health insurer’s pro-
jections of the difference in its cost of covering the relevant array of inter-
ventions for a subscriber population.
With relative value ratings available to enable insurers to specify differ-
ent depth of care levels at the time customers make insurance purchasing
decisions, a variety of slightly different products could flourish, depending
on consumer preferences. For example, rather than marketing policies that
provide no coverage for treatments that fall below a specified relative value
level threshold, insurers might choose to sell policies that offer some cover-
age for all rating levels but vary cost-sharing arrangements based on the
rating level of treatments. Interventions rated a “1” might qualify for 100
percent payment, for example, whereas interventions rated a “10” might re-
quire a 50 percent copayment.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 247, 268–69
(2003).
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D. Relative Value Ratings and the ACA
The subject of CER traditionally raises fears that the results will be used
to “ration” medical care,150 a term that has a history in the United States of
striking a political death knell for any health care proposal.151 Past attempts
by the Health Care Financing Administration to explicitly consider cost-ef-
fectiveness as part of Medicare coverage decisions met with fierce political
opposition and never became government policy, and even the suggestion
that it would consider cost when two treatments offered equivalent benefits
drew so much opposition that it failed to become law.152 Oregon’s highly
publicized attempt to determine what services would and would not be cov-
ered by Medicaid based on cost-effectiveness criteria is largely viewed as a
political disaster; it was quickly abandoned by Oregon itself and not imitated
by any other state.153 The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act forbids the government from using CER to withhold
coverage of new drugs.154
Reflecting this aversion to rationing, the ACA also includes provisions
designed to prohibit the use of CER as a basis for government determina-
tions as to what medical interventions will be provided to either the pri-
vately or publicly insured populations.155 The law explicitly provides that
results of CER cannot be used to mandate coverage or reimbursement for
private or public health insurance,156 and it also prohibits the use of CER as
the “sole[ ] . . . basis” of Medicare coverage denials.157
The fact that relative value ratings would empower individuals to make
their own cost–benefit trade-offs, rather than aiding government officials in
the rationing of care, should guarantee its legality under the ACA. The Act
prohibits PCORI from using dollars-per-QALY statistics “as a threshold to
150. See, e.g., Michael F. Cannon, A Better Way to Generate and Use Compara-
tive-Effectiveness Research 8 (2009), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
pubs/pdf/pa632.pdf.
151. See generally Neumann, supra note 110, at 138–40 (“For the most part, U.S. policy
makers haven’t attempted to use [cost-effectiveness analysis in health care] for political
reasons.”).
152. Id. at 20–23, 149.
153. For an analysis of the Oregon Health Plan’s experiment with using cost-effective-
ness criteria in the 1990s, see id. at 58–70.
154. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 § 622,
42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(6)(F) (2006) (barring regulations that apply a functional equivalence
standard for innovative medical treatments). See generally Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare
and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 353 New Eng. J. Med. 1516, 1517 (2005) (noting that “a stan-
dard of functional equivalence applies a cost-effectiveness principle”).
155. See Alan M. Garber & Harold C. Sox, The Role of Costs in Comparative Effectiveness
Research, 29 Health Aff. 1805, 1806 (2010) (observing that critics of CER in the health care
reform debate “raised the specter of rationing and government interference in patient care”).
156. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1182(c)(1), 124
Stat. 119, 740 (2010).
157. Id. § 1182(b).
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establish what type of health care is cost effective or recommended,”158 sug-
gesting that there is no legal bar to using cost information for other, less
directive purposes. And the Act explicitly authorizes the development of
guidelines that permit insurers to “utilize value-based insurance designs.”159
Unlike cost-effective analyses of medical treatments conducted under
government auspices in other countries—the most well known being the
United Kingdom’s National Institute for Clinical Excellence (“NICE”)160—
relative value ratings would carry no recommendation as to whether health
insurers should or should not provide the treatment. The rating would
merely indicate that the relative value of the treatment is greater than inter-
ventions with worse ratings and less than interventions with better ratings.
Patients would indicate whether they wish to expend resources on treat-
ments that have a given cost–benefit profile through their health insurance
purchasing decision. The end result is that the government, through CER,
would provide the public good of information, while enabling individuals
acting in markets to maximize their overall expected welfare through their
purchasing decisions.
V. Advantages of Relative Value Health Insurance
The fundamental benefit of RVHI, enabled by relative value ratings, is
its ability to help boundedly rational consumers to more rationally allocate
their resources between medical care and other desirable goods and services.
Secondary benefits of RVHI include aligning the interests of patients and
physicians and providing incentives for the efficient innovation and pricing
of medical care advances.
A. Better “Choice Architecture” for Consumers Than CDHC
In a world of hyper-rational individuals, people can be expected to
make choices and express preferences that maximize their SEU and, assum-
ing limited externalities, maximize social efficiency in so doing. The role for
policymakers is to facilitate access to information. If individuals are incom-
petent decisionmakers, paternalistic intervention with substituted decision-
making becomes appropriate.161 When individuals are boundedly rational
158. Id. § 1182(e).
159. Id. § 2713(c).
160. Established in 1999, NICE provides recommendations to the UK’s National Health
Service as to whether it should cover the cost of new technologies, based in large part—but
not entirely—on evidence of clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Neumann, supra
note 110, at 99–100. In about half the cases, NICE reports the cost-per-QALY as part of the
basis for its recommendation. Id. at 102. The government has the power to reject NICE’s
recommendations, but it has never done so. Steven D. Pearson & Michael D. Rawlins, Quality,
Innovation, and Value for Money: NICE and the British National Health Service, 294 JAMA
2618, 2619 (2005).
161. If basic values and stable preferences are so heterogeneous that decisions that max-
imize SEU for one maximize SEU for all, substituted decisionmaking might be justified as a
way to minimize transaction costs.
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decisionmakers, the best policy response is often to structure choices in a
way that helps decisionmakers to maximize accuracy at a realistic level of
cost and effort.162 This policy focus has been called “choice architecture,”163
which reflects the fact that preferences are constructed (as an architect con-
structs buildings) rather than simply uncovered (as an archaeologist uncov-
ers objects through excavation), and that it is possible for constructed
choices to be more accurate or less accurate depending on how they are
presented.164 Creating the rating information that would facilitate RVHI can
be understood as choice architecture that assists boundedly rational con-
sumers in acting through private markets to register their preferences for
allocating resources between medical care and other goods and services.
1. Complexity
Most obviously, RVHI would reduce the complexity individuals must
navigate when making trade-offs between medical care and competing
goods and services compared to point-of-treatment decisionmaking re-
quired under CDHC proposals. Rather than being asked to understand pros
and cons of numerous treatment options, with difficult-to-compare attrib-
utes (such as mortality and various measures of morbidity) and a range of
probabilistic outcome possibilities, consumers would need only to under-
stand a single depth-of-coverage rating. They would then make resource-
allocation decisions by trading off price against depth of coverage (i.e., a
Level 4 policy for $4,000 per year, a Level 5 policy for $4,900 per year, or a
Level 6 policy for $6,200 per year).
The extent to which consumers could accurately make the trade-off be-
tween the cost of insurance and depth of coverage depends not only on
collapsing the virtues and vices of various medical interventions into a single
metric but also on the ability of consumers to achieve a qualitative under-
standing of the different rating levels—that is, the difference in medical care
they could expect by purchasing a Level 6 policy rather than a Level 5 policy.
An important virtue of relative value ratings is that their qualitative nature
can be communicated to consumers relatively readily. At the time of insur-
ance enrollment, consumers could consult the current list of relative value
ratings for all treatments, organized by condition, which would provide con-
crete examples of what interventions would be covered by policies set at
different rating levels. Consumers would not need to understand the nu-
ances of each intervention on the list; they would need only to skim the list
to obtain a qualitative sense of the distinctions between rating levels.
Whatever cost–coverage trade-off a consumer made, he would know that his
premium dollars would cover the most relatively valuable medical interven-
tions and would not cover those of relatively lesser value. Paying a higher
162. See Gregory et al., supra note 47, at 178–79.
163. See generally Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 16.
164. See Gregory et al., supra note 47, at 179.
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price for deeper coverage would buy access to increasingly more marginally
beneficial care.
2. Novelty
The novelty of the decisionmaking process required of consumers would
also be significantly reduced under an RVHI regime compared to the CDHC
model. With the exception of individuals with chronic illnesses, most medi-
cal treatment decisions are highly novel for patients; this novelty increases
the difficulty that patients face in making accurate resource-allocation deci-
sions.165 In contrast, ex ante insurance purchasing decisions that require
consumers to allocate resources between categories of consumption are far
less novel. Furthermore, consumers would obtain experience each year in
making this type of decision and would receive feedback on the conse-
quences of that decision that would be useful in future years.
3. Points of Comparison
By collapsing the various attributes that together comprise the benefits
of medical care into a single scaled rating, RVHI would reduce the likelihood
that medical care choices will vary based on the vagaries of how information
is presented. If patients are asked to make point-of-treatment purchase deci-
sions, there is little hope of controlling or standardizing the presentation of
information. If a physician or hospital provides many alternatives, or de-
scribes many attributes of alternatives, a patient is likely to selectively use
only pieces of that information, and perhaps not the pieces most highly
correlated with accurate decisionmaking.166 If cost information is straight-
forward but treatment information is not, cost information might be salient,
causing patients to favor the lower cost intervention; if cost information is
complicated or uncertain and mortality information is straightforward, on
the other hand, patients might be inclined to favor the choice that dominates
on that attribute. RVHI, in contrast, enables the straightforward comparison
of two numbers: a rating level, representing the depth of coverage, and a
price.
4. Emotion-Laden Choices
When purchasing RVHI, some individuals might find it emotionally
costly to trade off future access to medical care for themselves or their de-
pendents against money, and thus might seek to adopt noncompensatory
strategies for making the decision: for example, purchasing the most exten-
sive coverage available (i.e., a Level 10 policy) regardless of price. But the
emotional nature of cost–health trade-offs is likely to be less severe when the
decisions are made ex ante, before services are required, rather than at the
165. See supra Section II.B.2.
166. See supra Section II.B.3.
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point of treatment, when the potential costs of forgoing the most compre-
hensive treatment are highly salient and the potential costs of overinvesting
in medical care at the cost of forgoing other goods and services are easier to
overlook.
If a car buyer were to adopt a truly noncompensatory decisionmaking
strategy, refusing to trade off health and safety against other attributes, he
would purchase the safest possible car, whatever its cost. But few people
actually behave in this way, regardless of their professed concern for safety.
The RVHI-purchasing decision would probably resemble the car-purchasing
decision to most consumers. It would be nice to have the promise of infinite
and unlimited medical care, just as it would be nice to have the safest car
that technology can produce. The reality, however, that resources are scarce
and dollars spent on medical care cannot be spent on other things would
likely encourage even boundedly rational decisionmakers to employ a con-
sciously compensatory decisionmaking approach, leading to more efficient
resource-allocation decisions.
B. Aligning the Interests of Physicians and Patients
A second important benefit of RVHI is that it can rationalize the
amount of resources allocated to medical care without driving a wedge be-
tween the interests of physicians and patients. Unlike proposals to pay physi-
cians based on the efficient use of resources, which would encourage them
to compromise their fiduciary duties and undermine professional norms,167
RVHI can reduce the inefficient overuse of medical care without causing
doctors to stray from their sole focus on patient health.
Against the backdrop of RVHI, physicians could recommend whatever
interventions they believe have the greatest expected clinical benefits. Such
recommendations will then be mediated by patient preferences for allocating
resources to medical care as opposed to other goods and services, as the level
of insurance that they purchased ex ante reflects. In some cases, a physician
will convey to a patient his belief that Treatment A is the most clinically
desirable option, even though it is not covered by the patient’s health insur-
ance policy (or it is covered at a much higher level of cost sharing) because
of its low relative value ranking.
C. Efficient Incentives for Innovation and Pricing
The moral hazard problem in health insurance creates incentives for
inefficient investment in the development of new medical technologies.
Since virtually all interventions with positive expected clinical benefits are
covered by insurance, drug and device manufacturers profit handsomely by
investing in marginal improvements over currently available technology.
167. See supra Section III.B.
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Large numbers of patients and physicians will then demand this new tech-
nology, even if it is priced far above the value of those marginal improve-
ments. Even worse, manufacturers have an incentive to invest in drugs and
devices that are no better than what is currently available, so long as they
believe that they can use advertising and marketing to convince physicians to
recommend them or patients to demand them.168
In a world of RVHI, the market potential will be much larger for drugs
and devices with a high marginal value compared to existing technology,
either because they are significantly more effective or because they are
equally effective but cost less. Although it is unclear what level of relative
value coverage most Americans would purchase, it is certain that many more
people would be insured for interventions rated “2” than for interventions
rated “8.” With market potential determined by relative value, manufactur-
ers would have the incentive to focus their efforts in areas with the greatest
potential for significant technological improvements, rather than, for exam-
ple, spending to create “me too” drugs that are only mildly differentiated
from currently available options.
RVHI would also create the conditions for the development of better
information about the effectiveness of interventions, even beyond research
that is publicly funded. Since drug and device manufacturers would need to
demonstrate the relative value of their products to obtain a relative value
rating, they would have an incentive to conduct research. But the advantages
go beyond this. Researchers currently have difficulty enrolling subjects in
clinical trials to test the efficacy of unproven treatments because patients can
often obtain the treatments even without a scientific basis for their use.169
The best-known example is the case of autologous bone marrow trans-
plants as a treatment for breast cancer. The treatment was eventually proven
completely ineffective, but it took nearly two decades for researchers to con-
duct valid clinical trials because of the widespread availability of the treat-
ment outside the trials.170 Understandably, but unfortunately, few patients
were willing to participate in a clinical trial, in which they might receive a
placebo, when their insurance company would pay to provide the treat-
ment.171 A relative value rating system could increase the number of patients
168. Cf. Dominick L. Frosch et al., Creating Demand for Prescription Drugs: A Content
Analysis of Television Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 5 Annals Fam. Med. 6, 6 (2007) (find-
ing that advertisements of prescription drugs to patients have “limited educational value” and
can be harmful to population health).
169. When patients can easily obtain an active treatment, they will be reluctant to sign
up for a controlled trial in which they may receive inert ingredients. Cf. Terrence F. Ackerman,
Therapeutic Beneficence and Placebo Controls, Am. J. Bioethics, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 21, 21–22
(discussing the thorny ethical as well as practical issues that placebo-controlled trials present
and concluding that the risk of harm to subjects in the placebo condition results from the
denial of best available therapy).
170. See H. Gilbert Welch & Juliana Mogielnicki, Presumed Benefit: Lessons from the
American Experience with Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 324 BMJ 1088 (2002).
171. With insurance companies fearful of liability for nonpayment of bone marrow
transplants to treat breast cancer, patients eschewed placebo trials studying the effectiveness of
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willing to participate in clinical trials by granting new and unproven treat-
ments administered within a clinical trial setting a provisional rating of “1”
but refusing to assign a rating outside that setting.
Finally, RVHI would provide innovators with an incentive to keep prices
low, even for patented innovations, because lower prices would translate
into a higher relative value rating and, thus, a larger pool of potential cus-
tomers. Take, for example, the patented drug Xolair, which is extremely ef-
fective at preventing asthma attacks when injected.172 At a price of up to
$30,000 per year for large doses, Xolair would earn a modest relative value
score, since cheap, generic inhaled steroids can provide most of the same
benefits if used every day.173 At a lower price point, however, it could earn a
much higher relative value rating, enabling its sale to patients with shallower
health insurance coverage.174
VI. Obstacles
RVHI is conceptually superior to CDHC, pay-for-performance propos-
als, and current cost-control efforts that do not address the problem of
moral hazard in health insurance. It promotes the efficient allocation of re-
sources to medical care by relying on private individuals’ market choices,
rather than governmental fiat, but it does so by using governmental ratings
to facilitate private decisions that it is reasonable to expect boundedly ra-
tional consumers to make with a high degree of accuracy. Notwithstanding
the advantages, RVHI represents an imperfect, second-best structure for the
allocation of social resources between medical care and other goods and ser-
vices, and there are substantial challenges to implementing the basic con-
cept. Although the details of creating an institutional structure to facilitate
RVHI are beyond the scope of this Article, this Part briefly identifies some of
the major implementation challenges and contends that, while significant,
none render the approach impossible to implement.
A. Creating the Ratings
1. Getting from Here to There
Perhaps the most obvious practical problem with moving to a relative
value system is the paucity of data with which to make relative value judg-
ments. Even assuming that ratings could be based on data less definitive
than double-blind, randomized, controlled studies of a broad cross-section
bone marrow transplants, convinced that the active treatment would save their lives. PBS New-
sHour: A Questionable Cure: Bone Marrow Transplants (PBS radio broadcast May 13, 1999),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-june99/bonemarrow_5-13.html.
172. Bloche, supra note 90, at 89–90.
173. See id.
174. In Australia, new, so-called “me-too” drugs can be listed on the national drug
formulary but only at the price point of the equivalent item. Neumann, supra note 110, at
97–98.
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of patients, there is currently insufficient information on which to base rea-
sonably informed ratings for the vast majority of medical interventions.175
This same problem helped doom Oregon’s effort to employ a cost-effective-
ness standard for determining Medicaid coverage in the 1990s.176 It would
take years of significant funding of the CER endeavor, plus a more efficient
institutional structure for conducting CER, before we could hope to have
good information for most treatments.177
While discouraging, this reality need not undermine the move to rela-
tive value ratings. The present lack of data might require that all commonly
accepted treatments for which there is no good comparative effectiveness
data be grandfathered into the system with a rating of “1.” For new inter-
ventions to obtain a rating—necessary for reimbursement under relative
value insurance policies—PCORI could require drug or device manufactur-
ers to submit comparative effectiveness data. In the meantime, congressio-
nally allocated funds for CER could fund relative value research on common
conditions or treatments for which large sums of money are spent without
the support of scientific evidence.
Launching a ratings system by giving the highest possible rating to inter-
ventions that we simply do not know enough about and thus cannot reason-
ably rate on a relative value scale will mean that, in the early years of RVHI,
the moral hazard problem endemic in the medical system will still be severe.
As time progresses and more new interventions come on line that are not
grandfathered in at high ratings levels, the moral hazard problem will grad-
ually recede. Although a delay in phasing relative value ratings into the
health insurance system is not optimal, it is important to remember that, in
the current state of the world, every intervention recommended by a doctor
is essentially granted a relative score of “1” by health insurance plans, and
the current system offers no hope of this ever changing. A phased-in system
of relative value ratings offers the promise of bending the curve of health
care costs over time, even if improvements would be gradual.
Other countries that have instituted some form of cost-effectiveness
analysis into their health care systems have used this type of grandfathering.
Australia, for example, began requiring cost-effectiveness data in 1992 for all
new pharmaceuticals before the country’s national drug formulary would
consider providing them. It then added similar requirements for services,
procedures, and diagnostics some years later.178
175. E.g., Schneider & Hall, supra note 40, at 22–23 (“ ‘Evidence-based medicine’ is
today’s watchword, but there is decent evidence for only a fraction (albeit a large fraction) of
medicine. . . . [T]reatments’ cost-effectiveness. . . . is even less available than information
about efficacy.”).
176. Neumann, supra note 110, at 64–65.
177. For a thoughtful essay on how to provide institutional support for large-scale CER,
see Robert B. Giffin & Janet Woodcock, Comparative Effectiveness Research: Who Will Do the
Studies?, 29 Health Aff. 2075 (2010).
178. Neumann, supra note 110, at 97.
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2. Implicit Value Choices
Building a relative value rating system requires reducing disparate inter-
ventions for disparate conditions to a single scale of expected marginal bene-
fits divided by marginal costs. There is no way around the fact that
measuring the benefits side of the equation requires value judgments, and
no basis for assigning a rating of “6” to one intervention and “7” to another
will mirror the values of all concerned.
It might be noncontroversial to say that an intervention expected to
extend life by an average of four years provides a greater benefit than one
expected to extend life by only three years. But what if the latter intervention
usually results in a higher quality of life during the shorter time period? And
how, for example, should we compare the value of an intervention that tends
to result in better cognitive functioning but less physical mobility to one
with the opposite likely outcome? What methodology should we use to com-
pare two interventions with similar average effects on mortality where one is
subject to greater variation—such that some patients live much longer and
some experience no benefit at all—and the other provides more predictable,
intermediate benefits for all patients? Should we give more weight to an
intervention expected to increase a patient’s lifespan from one year to two
years than one expected to increase a patient’s lifespan from eight years to
nine years? Should we give more weight to an intervention that is the only
one available for a certain condition than one with several alternatives, on
the ground that the former provides patients with the psychological benefit
of hope that they otherwise would not have? The list of difficult value trade-
offs could go on.179
It is a partial answer to say that health services researchers routinely
compare the benefits of incommensurable interventions by converting them
to a metric of QALYs, which take into account mortality and quality-of-life
indicia such as pain, illness, and disability.180 But this is only a partial re-
sponse. First, different elicitation measures will yield different results in
QALY calculations, and social scientists have yet to reach consensus on a
single methodology.181 Even more significantly, though, any methodology
for determining the expected value of an intervention in terms of QALYs
would necessarily compromise one of the supposed virtues of RVHI: that
whatever level of coverage an individual might purchase, he would know
that he was entitled to all care that was more cost-effective. By choosing a
179. See generally id. at 55 (noting that “researchers have long struggled” with how to
reconcile preference variations within a population when measuring the cost-effectiveness of
medical treatments).
180. See Garber & Sox, supra note 155, at 1806 (“Health benefits are typically measured
by the additional quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) produced by an intervention.”); Peter J.
Neumann & Milton C. Weinstein, Legislating Against Use of Cost-Effectiveness Information, 363
New Eng. J. Med. 1495, 1495 (2010) (“QALYs provide a convenient yardstick for measuring
and comparing health effects of varied interventions across diverse diseases and conditions.”).
181. Neumann, supra note 110, at 31–34 (describing methodological differences).
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low-cost policy, that customer would understand that very expensive treat-
ments that reduce mortality or morbidity only modestly, or that have only a
very small chance of reducing mortality or morbidity, would not be covered,
but he would believe that treatments with the greatest bang for the buck
would be covered. Since individuals often value different types of benefits
differently,182 however, it is possible that a given patient might find himself
covered for an intervention that (to him) offers modest cost-adjusted ex-
pected value and not covered for an intervention that (to him) has much
greater cost-adjusted expected value.
The justification for this result is the need to balance between optimiz-
ing the theoretical potential for maximal efficiency and creating decision-
making environments that are manageable for boundedly rational actors.
Creating a system in which individuals could fully optimize their allocation
of resources between medical care and competing goods and services would
require providing detailed and nuanced information about the distinct ben-
efits of various interventions.183 Introducing this type of information, how-
ever, would make it more costly and difficult for those same individuals to
trade off benefit levels against price. Attempting to get the macro decision
“right”—that is, providing the architecture that enables consumers to make
informed and stable choices about the allocation of their resources to medi-
cal care—requires simplifying information on the benefits side of the equa-
tion, even though it is clear that this strategy will fail to account for
heterogeneous preferences.
3. Industry Capture
Because value choices will necessarily affect how consumers measure
benefits, it would be impossible to keep politics out of relative value ratings
entirely. But it would greatly compromise the ability of relative value ratings
to help rationalize medical care expenditures if the ratings were set to con-
form with the profit interests of drug and device manufacturers and other
innovators who stand to earn more money if their interventions are awarded
higher ratings and are thus reimbursable under more insurance policies.
Two dangers of capture of the ratings process by industries with a finan-
cial incentive lurk. First, the value choices that underlie the measurement of
benefits could be designed to advantage, on average, those with a profit in-
centive. For this reason, the PCORI board, as provided by the ACA, which
includes representatives of the drug and device manufacturing community,
is probably suboptimal for the task.184
182. See, e.g., id. at 122 (concluding from studies that there are “[w]ide individual-to-
individual variations” in the values people place on different health statuses).
183. See Bloche, supra note 149, at 266.
184. Bloche, supra note 90, at 51 (stating that the makeup of PCORI’s governing
board “seems almost designed to enable stakeholders to block studies that threaten their inter-
ests”). See generally Pearson & Rawlins, supra note 160, at 2621–22 (making recommendations
concerning how to best insulate cost-effectiveness research from political pressure).
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Second, the process of evaluating CER and assigning relative value rat-
ings could be unduly influenced by industries with a financial interest in the
outcomes to the extent that the research is funded and provided primarily
by entities seeking ratings for their interventions. Undoubtedly, the develop-
ers of new technologies would attempt to design their data-collection prac-
tices in ways that would place their products and services in the best possible
light.185
It would be a mistake to underestimate the risks of industry capture and
manipulation posed by a system in which hundreds of millions of dollars of
profits to companies in the pharmaceutical, medical supply, and health care
industries could turn on ratings assigned to their products and services.186
But creating an administrative structure for CER that is shielded from politi-
cal pressure could, to a significant degree, counter this threat.
In addition, one important advantage of the relative ratings process, as
compared with current FDA approval processes for drugs and devices, is
that any lobbying efforts or research biased in favor of one company or
interest group would often invoke counterefforts by others. For example,
when a pharmaceutical manufacturer seeks FDA approval of a new drug, it
must demonstrate only safety and efficacy relative to a placebo,187 a subject
about which its competitors have little to say. To support a high relative
value rating, in contrast, the manufacturer would have to demonstrate its
cost-adjusted superiority to existing drugs, and the CER process could and
should be designed to permit the manufacturers of those competing drugs
to submit their own data concerning that comparison.
B. Operating a Ratings-Based Market
Once relative value ratings were assigned to various medical interven-
tions and insurance companies began to use ratings levels as the basis for
contracting, would the market operate acceptably?
185. See generally Neumann, supra note 110, at 38–43 (describing criticisms of cost-
effectiveness analysis on the ground that interested parties often sponsor the research).
186. A related risk is that if the effected economic interests are unable to control CER,
they might attempt to kill it. In 1995, a group representing back surgeons fought, ultimately
unsuccessfully, to eliminate the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (“AHCPR”) after
that agency issued a report that found no evidence to support the effectiveness of spinal fusion
surgery. Bradford H. Gray et al., AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health Services Research,
Health Aff., W3-297–98 (June 25, 2003), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/
06/25/hlthaff.w3.283.full.pdfťml.
187. Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information,
Health Aff., w574 (Nov. 7, 2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/6/w572.full.pdf
+html.
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1. Adverse Selection
A significant fear in any insurance market in which customers can select
different levels of coverage is adverse selection and an accompanying unrav-
eling of the market in what is sometimes called a “death spiral.”188 The spe-
cific concern here is that patient preferences concerning depth of insurance
coverage, as indicated by relative value ratings, might be based primarily on
a patient’s likelihood of becoming ill rather than on uncorrelated heteroge-
neity of preferences for consuming medical care relative to other goods and
services. If, for example, the relatively sick purchased Level 7 coverage and
the relatively healthy purchased Level 3 coverage, the actual cost to the in-
surer of providing Level 7 insurance would be higher than if it were provid-
ing Level 7 insurance for patients of average health. This, in turn, would
drive up the price of that coverage and drive away the healthiest of Level 7
customers, who were willing to pay the extra price for the deeper menu of
benefits that policy would provide but who were not willing to subsidize the
sicker patients with whom they find themselves pooled in the Level 7 group.
Assuming that sicker consumers cannot be charged more than others as
a result of their health status—a rule that has been applied to group health
insurance since the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act was
enacted in 1996189 and that was extended to the small-group and individual
markets as part of the ACA190—severe adverse selection can cause a cycle
that eventually leads to all customers purchasing less extensive coverage than
they actually would like to buy to avoid joining a risk pool with sicker (and
thus more expensive) customers. The market could conceivably unravel to
the point where only insurance products that provide the minimal coverage
level permitted would be financially viable.
Although the possibility of severe adverse selection cannot be ruled out
entirely, there is a reason to be optimistic that the market would reach a
stable equilibrium in which the relatively unhealthy would be spread out
across the distribution of relative-value products. On the one hand, for the
relatively sick, medical needs are likely to be more salient, increasing the
likelihood that they will seek a more comprehensive coverage package. On
the other hand, the relatively wealthy are likely to demonstrate similar pref-
erences since the marginal value of the dollars necessary to purchase more
comprehensive coverage is less as wealth increases. Since income is positively
correlated with good health,191 the pool of people electing more comprehen-
sive coverage is likely to contain both a less-healthy-than-average slice of the
population and a healthier-than-average slice of the population.
188. See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health
Insurance, in 1 Frontiers in Health Policy Research 1 (Alan M. Garber ed., 1998).
189. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 101(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1182(b)(1) (2006).
190. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat.
119, 155 (2010) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2006)).
191. See, e.g., Jonathan Meer et al., Exploring the Health–Wealth Nexus, 22 J. Health
Econ. 713 (2003).
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An RVHI system would have to include features that prevent individuals
from gaming the system by buying shallow policies when they are healthy
and then switching to deeper policies after becoming ill, thus effectively pay-
ing for more extensive coverage only after they know that they will need it.
The most likely method of discouraging this behavior would be to allow
insurers to cover individuals who switch to deeper policies only to the level
of their prior policy for any preexisting conditions, for a specified period of
time. For example, if a customer purchased a Level 3 policy and then
switched to a more generous Level 7 policy, he would be covered for Level 7
interventions for any new conditions he might develop, but he would only
be covered for Level 3 interventions for preexisting conditions.192
2. Subsidies and Health Exchanges
For Americans with employment-based, large-group health insurance
(for companies with more than 100 employees), the process of insurance
selection in light of RVHI would be no different than it is today.193 Employ-
ers would continue to act as intermediaries, providing one or many insur-
ance options for their employees. The only difference would be that the
options might differ in the depth of coverage offered, rather than just in the
breadth of services, identities of providers, or cost-sharing arrangements, as
is largely the case today. Self-insured employer groups—groups that directly
bear the cost of medical claims for members rather than purchasing third-
party insurance policies194—might choose to provide coverage for their em-
ployees to a specified relative value rating level as well, regardless of the
group’s size.
The ACA requires that, beginning in 2014 (with exceptions for
grandfathered plans), small-group and individual health insurance policies,
whether offered through a system of state health insurance exchanges or
outside the exchange system, must provide a minimum set of “essential
192. The ACA provides that insurers may not deny coverage of or charge differentially
for preexisting conditions. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1101. Because the
ACA assumes that coverage depth will not differ across policies, this provision allows custom-
ers to change insurers without losing benefits that they would have effectively been paying for
under a prior policy. The general policy is not undermined if, in a world in which customers
contract for different benefit depths, they are not permitted to shift into deeper coverage after
becoming ill, as long as they are free initially to choose which rating-level risk pool to enter
and are covered for preexisting conditions up to that rating level if they later choose to shift
into a different rating-level risk pool.
193. As of 2006, 55 percent of Americans had employment-based insurance. Sara R.
Collins et al., Whither Employer-Based Health Insurance? The Current and Future Role of U.S.
Companies in the Provision and Financing of Health Insurance, The Commonwealth Fund, 7
fig.1 (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Collins_whitheremployer-
basedhltins_1059.pdf.
194. See Definitions of Health Insurance Terms, Bureau Lab. Stat., 6 http://www.
bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/healthterms.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (explaining the nature of self-
insured plans).
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health benefits.”195 The Act provides that, to meet this requirement, benefits
must be at least equal in “scope” to benefits provided by a typical employer
plan and must cover ten benefit categories, ranging from hospitalization to
laboratory services to pediatric oral and vision care.196 Within these parame-
ters, the Act grants the secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) the
authority to specify what will and will not comply with the essential health
benefits requirement.197 Under this authority, HHS promulgated a rule pro-
viding that approved policies must be “substantially equal” to relevant
benchmark plans and that plans which differ substantively in their provision
of benefits must have benefits “actuarially equivalent” to the benefits they
replace.198
Under this regulation, it seems unlikely that an RVHI policy for individ-
uals or small groups would pass muster. The range of employer-provided
plans that could serve as benchmark plans cover all medically necessary
treatments within coverage categories, so an RVHI policy that covered the
same breadth of categories but only to a depth of Level 5, for example,
would not be actuarially equivalent to the benchmark. Since the ACA statu-
tory requirements speak only to breadth of coverage, not to depth, however,
it would probably be within the authority of HHS to, in the future, set a
floor concerning the depth of coverage that small-group and individual in-
surance policies must provide (i.e., Level 3 or Level 5) in addition to a mini-
mum breadth of benefits. This would enable RVHI products to flourish, to
the extent that the market favors them, within the ACA framework.
To make health insurance more affordable, the ACA also establishes a
system of tax credits that will subsidize the purchase of insurance on the
health insurance exchanges by low- and moderate-income individuals and
families without employer-sponsored coverage. The size of the tax credit is a
complicated function of both the purchaser’s income and the cost of insur-
ance policies on the exchange that cover 80 percent of the actuarial value of
the benchmark plan.199 An RVHI system could provide much-needed flexi-
bility for the federal government as the ACA’s health insurance exchanges
become established and the actual costs of the subsidies specified by the Act,
now only projections, become clear.200 Rather than setting subsidy levels
195. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302 (2010). For the provision estab-
lishing the health care exchanges, see id. § 1311(b).
196. Id. § 1302.
197. Id.
198. 45 C.F.R. 156.135.
199. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1401–02 (2010).
200. As of May 2013, the CBO estimates that the ACA’s subsidies will cost $1.075 tril-
lion from 2014 to 2023. Effects on Health Insurance and the Federal Budget for the Insurance
Coverage Provisions in the Affordable Care Act—May 2013 Baseline, Cong. Budget Off., tbl.3
(May 14, 2013), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44190_EffectsAf-
fordableCareActHealthInsuranceCoverage_2.pdf.
February 2014] Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture 569
based on the costs lawmakers believe make a benchmark policy (that essen-
tially covers all treatments to Level 10) affordable,201 subsidy levels could
potentially be reduced if lawmakers were to determine that a shallower level
of coverage represents an appropriate entitlement. For example, future
lawmakers might choose to subsidize exchange customers only to the extent
that they could then reasonably afford to purchase, say, a Level 7 policy,
rather than a Level 10 policy.
The fact that regulators would need to choose a rating level on which to
base health insurance exchange subsidy levels might appear to undermine
the claim that RVHI has the benefit of avoiding governmental rationing.
After all, public choices concerning subsidies would impact the affordability
of different levels of relative value insurance. But whatever relative value rat-
ing level the government uses as the basis for subsidy determinations, sub-
sidy recipients should still be permitted to purchase insurance at whatever
rating level they wish, thus making their own ex ante rationing decisions. In
other words, if an individual receives a $1,000 subsidy because the govern-
ment decides that this amount is necessary to make a Level 5 policy afforda-
ble for a person of his income level, he should be permitted to purchase a
Level 4 policy and effectively put part of the subsidy toward noninsurance
goods and services if he so chooses, or to purchase a Level 6 policy by
skimping in other areas in order to afford a higher premium.
It is fair to say that the government’s selection of a rating level on which
to base subsidy calculations would have an indirect effect on private ration-
ing decisions in the following sense: the larger the subsidy the government
provides, the deeper the policies the insurance recipients will purchase, at
least on average. Larger subsidies would increase the income of lower-in-
come Americans, and wealthier individuals would likely spend more money
on medical care (as well as other goods), everything else being equal. But
any effect of governmental policy on the depth of health insurance pur-
chased would be due to the subsidies, not due to the relative value rating
system.
3. Individual and Subgroup Variation
The medical community has traditionally been suspicious of clinical
practice guidelines and similar attempts to use general algorithms to specify
the type of care that it should provide to an individual patient.202 This is
sometimes attributed to a self-interested desire of physicians to protect their
201. Affordability is in the eye of the beholder, of course. Subsidy levels established by
the ACA might or might not make health insurance “affordable” for Americans with various
levels of income. But the subsidy levels are implicitly based on the ideology that the govern-
ment should make it possible for all Americans to afford insurance that covers all “medically
necessary” treatments within covered categories of care.
202. See, e.g., Terrence M. Shaneyfelt & Robert M. Centor, Reassessment of Clinical Prac-
tice Guidelines: Go Gently into That Good Night, 301 JAMA 868 (2009).
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realm of autonomy, regardless of the effects on patient health.203 The more
charitable explanation, however, is that the best treatment for a particular
patient sometimes depends on that patient’s unique health characteristics—
such as personal illness history, comorbidities, family history, genetics, and
so on—that are simply too subtle and individualistic to be captured by algo-
rithms that specify the best care on average for a large population.204
The problem of individual variation presents a similar problem for rela-
tive value ratings. Drug A might be costlier and no more effective than Drug
B for most people, earning a relative value rating of “10.” But for a minority
of patients with a stomach sensitivity or allergy to Drug B, Drug A might
provide a substantial marginal benefit.205 Watchful waiting might be the
most cost-effective treatment by far for the average prostate cancer sufferer
diagnosed at age seventy, but a particular comorbidity might make the bene-
fits of surgery much greater for a particular patient. To generalize the prob-
lem, a patient who has purchased a Level 5 policy might find that he is
ineligible for a treatment that has earned a relative value rating of “7” be-
cause of its low average cost-effectiveness for the population in general but
that would be as cost-effective for him as other interventions rated “2.”
As briefly mentioned above,206 relative value ratings should be contin-
gent and flexible enough to incorporate all relevant variations between sub-
groups.207 Thus, in an ideal world, a particular intervention would not be
rated “5” for all purchasers but instead might have different ratings for dif-
ferent population subgroups based on characteristics of each group that are
correlated with the benefits the intervention provides, the benefits alterna-
tive interventions provide, or the costs of either.
One implication of subgroup-contingent relative value ratings is that, in
some cases, relatively less healthy individuals would be entitled to greater
care than healthier individuals who purchased insurance of the same depth,
because the former would sometimes obtain greater relative benefits from a
treatment than would the latter. This is consistent, however, with the basic
nature of health insurance, according to which people who are healthier
203. See Stefan Timmermans & Aaron Mauck, The Promises and Pitfalls of Evidence-
Based Medicine, 24 Health Aff. 18, 23 (2005) (“[The assumption that] good clinicians would
automatically follow [scientifically-based treatment recommendations] . . . . ignores a key
characteristic of professionalism: autonomy and discretion in professional work.”).
204. See, e.g., Robert S.A. Hayward et al., Canadian Physicians’ Attitudes About and Pref-
erences Regarding Clinical Practice Guidelines, 156 Can. Med. Ass’n J. 1715, 1720 (1997) (“A
sizeable minority felt that guidelines are too rigid to apply to individual patients, challenge
physician autonomy and are oversimplified.”).
205. See, e.g., Carolanne Dai et al., National Trends in Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitor Use
Since Market Release: Nonselective Diffusion of a Selectively Cost-Effective Innovation, 165
Archives Internal Med. 171, 171 (2005) (discussing clinical choice between classes of drugs
with similar efficacy but differential risk of gastrointestinal side effects predicted by risk
factors).
206. See supra Section IV.C.
207. Cf. Garber & Sox, supra note 155, at 1807 (CER should take into account “patient-
specific characteristics that account for differences in the way individuals respond to therapy”).
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generally fail to see the same direct return on their premium dollars as do
people who are sicker.
Another implication, however—and one that might be more controver-
sial208—is that those who stand to obtain greater benefit from an interven-
tion because they are healthier would sometimes qualify for treatment that
sicker patients would not. For example, a kidney transplant for a patient
with end-stage renal disease might be rated a “3” for an otherwise healthy
person expected to tolerate the transplant well but be rated a “7” for a pa-
tient with a compromised immune system or other comorbidities that indi-
cate that he would be a less successful transplant recipient.209
The more significant problem with subgroup variation in ratings,
though, is the practical obstacles to generating the CER necessary to derive
nuanced and contingent relative value ratings, even assuming high levels of
funding. Some subgroup differentiation would be possible but the amount
of differentiation would undoubtedly fall short of the ideal overall.210 Con-
sumers who would be willing to accept health insurance that would only
provide them with relatively cost-effective treatments in return for a lower
price might balk if the ratings are not well tailored, such that they might one
day be denied an intervention that is highly cost-effective given their unique
circumstances but that carries a relative value rating based on its low average
value for the population as a whole.
C. The Inevitability of Context Effects
Relative value ratings would make allocating resources between medical
care and other goods and services into a relatively tractable decisionmaking
problem by combining all information about depth of coverage into a single
208. See Rob Stein, New Kidney Transplant Rules Would Favor Younger Patients, Wash.
Post, Feb. 24, 2011, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2011/02/23/AR2011022306875.html (quoting University of Chicago bioethicist and physi-
cian Lainie Friedman Ross as calling a kidney-allocation proposal that would favor younger
transplant patients for health and longevity reasons “age discrimination”); see also Neumann
& Weinstein, supra note 180, at 1496 (observing that opposition to cost-per-QALY analysis can
reflect the concern “that the metric unfairly favors younger and healthier populations that
have more potential QALYs to gain”).
209. Under current rules, kidneys are primarily allocated based on how long a candi-
date has been waiting (although certain extreme comorbidities can make a patient categori-
cally ineligible). See Policy 3.5: Allocation of Deceased Kidneys, Organ Procurement &
Transplantation Network (July 25, 2013), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBy-
laws2/policies/pdfs/policy_7.pdf. In 2011, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Net-
work proposed a new metric that would allocate 20 percent of kidneys based on survival
matching and 80 percent of kidneys by age matching to better maximize health and longevity
of transplant recipients. Concepts for Kidney Allocation, Organ Procurement & Transplan-
tation Network, 7–8 (Feb. 16, 2011), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/SharedContentDocu-
ments/KidneyConceptDocument.pdf.
210. Cf. Bloche, supra note 90, at 53 (“There’s a fractal geometry of clinical differ-
ences—an endless variation in patients’ responses to pathogens, pills, and procedures. So it’s
just about always possible to argue, ‘Our patients are different’—different enough to benefit
from a therapy that’s been proven inferior for the population as a whole.”).
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rating. Still, the decisionmaking problem faced by consumers purchasing
RVHI would be far from simple or straightforward. A recent study demon-
strates that a majority of consumers failed to identify the best hypothetical
insurance option from a set of four choices when the single dimension of the
choice was cost, even when their expected medical care needs were clearly
specified, and when the cost variable was divided between insurance premi-
ums, copayments, and annual deductibles.211 Many individuals would un-
doubtedly search for heuristics that could help make the choice between
RVHI options easier ex ante and easier to justify ex post.
Empirical evidence in the prospect theory tradition indicates that losses
loom larger than gains for many people, which leads to a general bias in
favor of the status quo state of the world.212 Changes from the status quo
imply a combination of losses and gains, but the affective value of the losses
is greater, thus promoting conservatism. It seems quite likely that individu-
als offered a variety of RVHI policies who are unsure how to trade off cost
against depth of coverage will search for evidence of what price–coverage
combination constitutes the status quo and then choose to purchase that
option. These consumers might view the status quo as insurance that covers
all clinically effective treatments because that is what is covered today under
the “medical necessity” standard, framing any type of cost–benefit limita-
tions in health insurance as a “loss” to be avoided at almost any cost.
Other consumers will undoubtedly employ other heuristics. The princi-
ple of extremeness aversion213 suggests that many consumers might gravitate
toward Level 5 policies: the central location of the number 5 on a 10-point
scale would likely imbue it with a patina of moderation. Others might see
the rating level assumed by the government for purposes of determining
subsidy levels for low-income individuals as a coordination point and might
simply purchase a policy that provides that level of coverage. A general ten-
dency toward myopia might cause still other consumers to discount future
benefits too steeply, thus purchasing inefficiently shallow insurance coverage
compared to what percentage of income their more carefully considered
selves would allocate to health care.214
This analysis suggests that this Article’s criticism of CDHC as a method
of rationalizing health care expenditures can also be leveled against RVHI.
That is, the difficulty of constructing preferences will, to some extent, un-
dermine the accuracy of consumer choices even if RVHI policies become
211. Eric. J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value
of Choice Architecture, Soc. Sci. Res. Network (July 9, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=229
1598.
212. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1227, 1250 (2003).
213. Tversky & Simonson, supra note 54, at 1183 (“[O]ptions with extreme values
within an offered set will be relatively less attractive than options with intermediate values.”).
214. See generally Mark V. Pauly & Frederic E. Blavin, Moral Hazard in Insurance,
Value-Based Cost Sharing, and the Benefits of Blissful Ignorance, 27 J. Health Econ. 1407,
1411–12 (2008) (considering the welfare consequences of health care consumers undervaluing
the actual benefits of medical treatments).
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available in the marketplace. The difference in the degree of the problem,
however, is substantial. By assimilating the most complex nonprice attrib-
utes of health insurance into a single, scaled rating, RVHI would make criti-
cal decisions about medical care far more manageable than they would be in
a world dominated by CDHC, even though it would not always result in the
best allocations of resources between medical care and other goods and
services.
Conclusion
This Article has argued that using CER to create relative value ratings of
medical interventions could form the basis for a market approach to ratio-
nalizing medical care utilization in a way that takes consumer bounded ra-
tionality seriously. As such, it has focused on the portion of the U.S.
population that has private health insurance or is expected to purchase pri-
vate health insurance once the ACA is fully implemented. The power of rela-
tive value ratings can also be used to help rationalize expenditures of public
insurance programs, however. Although a thorough consideration of the
public insurance implications requires a separate article, a few brief observa-
tions can be made here.
Medicare and, to a lesser extent, Medicaid suffer from the same moral
hazard problem as private health insurance: in some cases, categories of
treatments are excluded from coverage, but within categories of covered
care, insurance covers patients for most medically indicated care consistent
with professional standards without regard to cost-effectiveness.215 If CER
were harnessed to create relative value ratings, individuals qua citizens
(working through their elected officials) could choose between allocating
public funds to health insurance programs and allocating public funds to
competing goods and services by comparing the cost of covering the insured
populations at different ratings levels.
For example, at the time of budgeting, governmental actuaries could
project the total cost of covering the Medicare population during the next
fiscal year at a variety of relative value levels. By looking at the current rela-
tive value rankings, lawmakers could see quite clearly which interventions
would be covered and which would not be covered, depending on the final
215. See Saver, supra note 20, at 2167. By statute, Medicare covers care that is “reasona-
ble and necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (2006). The administrative process is complex, but
it is fair to say that Medicare’s approval process is extremely liberal, much like those of private
insurance providers. See Neumann et al., supra note 154, at 1516 (“Medicare’s policy of paying
for any medical advance that has positive benefits, regardless of its cost, is unsustainable.”);
Peter J. Neumann et al., Therapies for Advanced Cancers Pose a Special Challenge for Health
Technology Assessment Organizations in Many Countries, 31 Health Aff. 700, 703–04 (2012)
(finding that all fifty-nine cancer drugs approved by the FDA between 2004 and 2008 were
covered by Medicare, whereas the United Kingdom’s National Health System covers fewer than
half the cancer drugs that receive regulatory approval in Europe); Sean R. Tunis, Why Medicare
Has Not Established Criteria for Coverage Decisions, 350 New Eng. J. Med. 2196, 2197 (2004)
(“Health care services are generally covered when there is adequate evidence that they improve
health outcomes, irrespective of the unit or aggregate cost.”).
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budget allocation, mirroring the decisionmaking process that relative value
ratings would allow individuals to enter into when purchasing private insur-
ance. Legislators (and voters) would be able to see, for example, that if they
wished for Medicare to cover brand-name drugs where equivalent generics
exist, they would have to fund Medicare at Level 8; or that if they wanted to
provide extraordinary interventions to maintain life in its final days for that
population, they would have to fund Medicare at least at Level 5; or that if
they wanted to enable otherwise healthy, Medicare-eligible citizens to receive
costly organ transplants, they would have to fund that program at Level 7.
Because the payers and the beneficiaries of Medicare and Medicaid are
different groups, RVHI would not necessarily mimic economic efficiency or
reduce moral hazard in the public insurance context in the way that it would
in the private insurance context. But relative value ratings would help clarify
and elucidate the trade-offs between funding public medical care on the one
hand and funding other public priorities, reducing taxes, or paying down
the national debt on the other.
Relative value ratings would also be extremely valuable if Medicare were
to be changed from a fixed entitlement to a voucher program, as the most
recent congressional budget, drafted by current House Budget Committee
chairman and former vice presidential candidate Paul Ryan proposed216 and
some conservative health economists support.217 If health care inflation con-
tinues to exceed the general rate of inflation, as the CBO predicts that it will,
Medicare premium support payments will lose purchasing power over
time.218 RVHI would enable beneficiaries to control out-of-pocket coinsur-
ance costs by choosing to purchase shallower coverage. As in the private
insurance context, relative value ratings would ensure that, at whatever level
of coinsurance payments were chosen, insurance plans would provide the
more cost-effective interventions and would not provide the less cost-effec-
tive interventions.
216. H.R. Rep. No. 113–17, at 85 (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-113hrpt17/pdf/CRPT-113hrpt17.pdf. Turning Medicare into a voucher system was also
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